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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS
ON CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
MAY 2009
SUNGHA HWANG, B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott
Conflict theory has in recent years found important applications and made con-
tributions in fields such as economics, political sciences and evolutionary biology.
Economists have examined various aspects and implications of appropriation, a
typical example of conflicting economic interests, in rent-seeking models. Political
scientists, focusing on political turmoil such as war, civil war and demonstration,
have scrutinized the effects of conflictual outcomes on political transitions and po-
litical systems. More importantly, early human lethal conflict is being recognized
as a key factor in explaining human cooperation in evolutionary biology.
The first essay concerns the technical aspects of conflict theories. Two well-
known forms of contest success functions predict contest outcomes from the dif-
ference between the resources of each side and from the ratio of resources. The
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analytical properties of a given conflict model, such as the existence of equilibrium,
can be drastically changed simply by altering the form of the contest success func-
tion. Despite this problem, there is no consensus about which form is analytically
better or empirically more plausible. In this essay we propose an integrated form of
contest success functions which has the ratio form and the difference form as lim-
iting cases and study the analytical properties of this function. We also estimate
different contest success functions to see which form is more empirically probable,
using data from battles fought in seventeenth-century Europe and during World
War II.
In the second essay we explore the application of conflict theory to the collective
action problem in large groups. We examine critically the traditional understanding
of the role of large groups in collective action using an idea initiated in evolutionary
biology. Bingham uses Lanchester’s square law to claim that the remote killing abil-
ity of humans and their precursors decreases the cost of punishment, when cheating
behavior can be punished by other members. By modeling this technology and in-
corporating individual members’ choice of behavior types, we show that as long
as the defector is, even slightly, less collective than the punisher, the large group
effect pervades. So we may conclude that the large group effect is quite robust,
considering the fact that the defectors, because of their behavioral predisposition,
would be reluctant to cooperate in any type of collective action.
In the final essay we address conflict and cooperation from a slightly different
perspective: conflict and cooperation associated with class alliances and conflict in
a society. Economic and political problems have been examined primarily within
the context of a dyadic relationship, i.e. between two actors. However, when two
different categories of groups are considered, subgroups within these groups may
have both common interests and conflicts. Appropriative activity by a ruling class
vii
of capitalists and landlords gives rise to class conflict between the ruling class and
the ruled class. The struggle over the relative price between the goods of the urban
manufacturing sector and the products of the agricultural sector can divide the
ruling and ruled classes and unite the capitalists and the workers. Using coali-
tional game theory, we study the various conditions, such as the political strength
of one class relative to that of other classes and the degree of economic conflict
among classes, for coalition formation among these classes. We show that when
the economic conflict over tariffs and the rate of appropriation escalates and one
class is politically superior to others, the exclusion of that class might occur, so the
originally strong class can end up being disadvantaged.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW AND MAIN RESULTS
1.1 Overview
1.1.1 Conflict and Contests
Traditionally scholars treated conflict as a pathological state that needed spe-
cial treatment. However in recent years, various theories of conflict have found
important applications and made contributions in fields such as economics, politi-
cal sciences, and evolutionary biology.
Among economists, research activities to combine the analysis of conflict with
the traditional economic theory were pioneered by Jack Hirshleifer and Herschel
Grossman (Hirshleifer, 1978, 1985, 1991; Grossman, 1994, 2001). Hirshleifer (1991)
studies appropriative activities such as actual or threatened theft, robbery, or con-
fiscation when the property rights are not well-defined. More concretely, Hirsh-
leifer (1991) explores the trade-off between production and appropriation in a con-
flict model, in which two sides produce a common pool income and spend their
resources to fight for a share of income. One of the important implications is that
increased productive complementarity between the parties does not systematically
favor peace. Moreover, the poorer side is motivated to fight more decisively, so con-
flict can be an income-equalizing process. Allowing for conflict and appropriation
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changes the standard findings from traditional economic theories.
Adopting similar approaches, Grossman examines topics covering conflict over
claims to property, conflict between producers and predators, civil conflict, class
conflict, and peace and war in interstate conflict. Effective property rights, which
the conventional economic approaches treat as given, can be altered by appropria-
tive activities. As a result, the allocation of resources and the distribution of gains
does not depend solely on productive activities as the conventional economic theo-
ries presuppose. So we need to consider the theory of “endogenous determination
of the equilibrium distribution of property”(Grossman, 1994, p.705). Focusing on
the interplay between production and appropriation Grossman studies the effects
of conflict in the allocation of scarce resources among alternative uses and the
distribution of the resulting products.
Another way of understanding conflict is in terms of a contest, which is usually
defined as “a game in which participants expend resources on arming so as to
increase the probability of winning if conflict were to actually take place” (Garfinkel
and Skaperdas, 2006, p.1). In a contest the side that spends the most obtains
the prize; examples include auctions, athletic races, election campaignings, and
wars (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992; Konrad, 2007) The most significant fact about a
contest is that its rewards is not proportional to marginal product, average product,
or total product.
Conflict or theories of contest also have figured in rent-seeking literature. In
a paper titled “The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft”, Gordon Tul-
lock points out that interest group activities were somewhat similar to theft, as
new policies transfer income and wealth from one group to another without any
compensation (Tullock, 1967).
A government can create a monopolistic position for a firm or an industry by
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creating various entrance barriers and imposing tariffs, and the special surplus or
profit engendered by this protection is called rents. The monopolistic rent can
be regarded as a prize in a contest and each interested group can affect the gov-
ernment’s decision by hiring lobbyists to acquire the prize. Krueger (1974) uses
the term, “rent-seeking”, to describe this kind of behavior as opposed to “profit-
seeking”. So we can view a game where groups spend their resources to obtain a
monopolistic rent as an example of contests, and hence the activities of capturing
the prize can be described by the technology of conflict. It is in this context that
Tullock uses a well-known contest success functions, often called the Tullock form
or ratio form, in his model of rent-seeking (Tullock, 1980). We provide a more
precise description of contest success functions below.
The main point of Tullock and Krueger is that when we correctly account for
resources spent in lobbying, bribing, and various rent-seeking activities, the welfare
loss is much bigger than the case in which we only consider Harberger’s “dead-
weightloss” triangle (Harberger, 1954). Since these important contributions, the
arguments of rent-seeking bahavior were extended to cover a broad range of topics:
privatization, development policy, foreign aid, the aging problem in a society, and
tax avoidance (For example, see Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, 1980).
In a broader context, Schelling views conflict as a bargaining situation in which
“one participant to gain his ends is dependent on the choices of decisions of oth-
ers” (Schelling, 1980, p.5). More specifically Schelling considers “the strategy of
conflict” such as surprise attacks in a situation of mutual distrust and threats like
deterrence, when one’s strategic behavior can influence another’s expectations.
Inter-state wars or civil wars, both obvious examples of conflicts, have been im-
portant topics in political science and operational research. To political scientists
the main question is why war takes place or recurs even if bargaining or negotiating
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based on unwasted resources by avoiding wars is possible. Fearon (1995), as one of
the rationalist explanations of wars, asserts that rational leaders cannot achieve a
mutually beneficial settlement because of the commitment problem and asymmet-
ric information − for example, leaders’ private information about their militaries
capabilities or willingness to fight. The specific implications of conflict technology
have been explored and studied by political scientists; for instance, Kalyvas, Bal-
celles, and Rohner (2008) studied the effect of the demise of cold war on the decline
and transformation of civil wars by varying fighting effectiveness of adversaries.
The Correlates of War (COW) project is a preeminent project to collect data
about international wars and civil wars, initiated by David Singer, a political sci-
entist. A vast body of empirical research about the cause and the continuation
of war has been conducted using this data (For example, see Collier and Hoeffler,
2001). Sambanis (2004) raises questions about the credibility of this data set be-
cause of coding problems, which critically depend on how civil wars are defined
and measured.
Retired army colonel Dupuy has also constructed the HERO (Historical Evalu-
ation and Research Organization) data set covering wars from 1600 through 1973,
based on a vast literature including Bodart (1908). Dupuy scrutinizes 81 engage-
ments between the Allied and German forces in 1943-44, and concludes that Ger-
mans consistently outperformed the Allies in their ability to wage combat by com-
paring the combat efficiencies of each force. Dupuy also emphasizes the importance
of other qualitative aspects including morale and leadership. This point has been
further developed by Biddle (2004) in his book Military Power. Biddle advances the
arguments that the doctrine and tactics which armies use − “force employment”
in his words − is a key determinant of the result of modern wars. Consequently,
he also claims that supremacy in numbers sometimes can be almost irrelevant de-
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pending on the force enforcement of two sides (Biddle, 2004).
More significantly, evolutionary biologists or anthropologists turned to conflict
theory in explaining the evolution of human cooperation. Since human cooperation
is individually costly, but socially beneficial, the evolution of human cooperation
poses similar questions to the public good problem. Boyd and Richerson (1992)
argue that the enforcement of cooperation, and hence the evolution of it, would be
possible by retribution - punishment that is directed solely at noncooperators by
the punisher. Thus, retribution differs from the punishment strategy in a repeated
prisoner’s dilemma, which withholds future cooperation. Subsequently, many re-
searchers adopt retribution as a key institution ensuring cooperation in human
society (Bingham, 1999, 2000; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson, 2003).
Another instance in which conflict plays an important part in the exposition
of human cooperation is group conflict and group selection. Group selection the-
ory, ignored for a long time among biologists, has received renewed attention since
Boyd and Richerson (1990). Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, and Richerson (2003) showed
that intergroup competition and reproductive leveling might have allowed the pro-
liferation of altruistic cooperation. Recently Choi and Bowles (2007) shows that
altruism − the nature of cooperative types − and parochialism − hostility toward
other groups − can coevolve by promoting group conflict; Bowles (2008) asserts
that paradoxically the parochial conflict was the “midwife” of altruism.
1.1.2 Technology of Conflict
The technology of conflict − “a technology whereby some or all contenders
incur costs in an attempt to weaken or disable competitors” − is often described
by contest success functions (Hirshleifer, 1991, p.130). Contest success functions,
which give the winning probabilities of each side according to resources devoted
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to conflict, have been used in most conflict models. Two major families of contest
success functions have been adopted in conflict models (Tullock, 1980; Hirshleifer,
1989). The first is the difference form of contest success functions which predicts the
outcome of contests based on the difference between contenders’ forces or resources;
the second one, called the Tullock form or the ratio form of contest success function,
specifies contest power as a function of the ratio of forces or effort.
Comparing these two forms, Hirshleifer (1989) observes that in contests de-
scribed by the ratio form, one side will certainly lose a whole prize if it does not
exert any effort, while in a conflict model with the difference form a side has a posi-
tive probability of obtaining the prize even if it does not devote any effort. Because
of these properties, he claims that the ratio form is applicable “when clashes take
place under close to “idealized” conditions such as: an undifferentiated battlefield,
full information, and unflagging weapon effectiveness”. In contrast, the differ-
ence form applies “where there are sanctuaries and refuges, where information is
imperfect, and where the victorious player is subject to fatigue and distraction”
(Hirshleifer, 1989, p.104).
In an attempt to put the use of contest success functions on a “surer footing” and
develop “a better understanding of any advantages or limitations” of various contest
success functions, Skaperdas axiomatizes them (Skaperdas, 1996, p.284). He shows
that when the contest success function satisfies (1) probability, (2) monotonicity,
(3) anonymity, (4) consistency, and (5) independence from irrelevant alternatives,
the functional form is given by an additive form. In addition, within the additive
form, the difference form is shown to be a unique form which predicts winning
probabilities based on the difference between resources; the ratio from is proven to
be a unique form which depends on the ratio of resources.
Another derivation of contest success functions is the stochastic derivation,
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which originated from econometric studies of discrete choice. If resources or ef-
fort Ei is a proxy for the performance of contenders and the performance of each
depends on the noisy term i, where i = 1, 2 denotes each side, the winning prob-
ability for side 1 may be represented in Pr{E1 + 1 > E2 + 2}. McFadden (1974)
shows that when i follows a type I extreme value distribution, Pr{E1+1 > E2+2}
gives the difference form of contest success functions. Similar characterization for
the ratio form is given by Jia (2008); when the performance depends on Eii, the
ratio form of contest success function corresponds to Pr{E11 > E22}.
We note that when i is an additive noise and follows a normal distribution, we
might obtain a new contest success function, possibly called “probit ”form, from
Pr{E1 + 1 > E2 + 2}. However this “probit” form has not been used much in
the existing literature, because this form cannot be expressed explicitly in known
functions.
A more direct description of conflict technology was given by Frederick Lanch-
ester during the height of World War I (Lanchester, 1916). Lanchester originally
proposed two types of differential equations which describe the attrition rates of
engaging armies in warfare:
Square Law:
dx
dt
= −κy, dy
dt
= −φx
Linear Law :
dx
dt
= −κxy, dy
dt
= φyx
In the first equation fighters in armies can concentrate on each other, so the reduc-
tion in x, ∆x, is proportional to the total number of fighters of opponent y. The
situation is different if Y cannot concentrate; for example, fighters of X might be
invisible to Y.as in guerrilla battles. In this case, which is described by the second
equation, we expect that the reduction in x depends on x in addition to y since
the larger X is, the more likely it will be that Y hits X’s combatants.
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By simple manipulations we see that in the first system of equations the outcome
of battles depends on the square of the ratio of competing forces, hence its name,
square law. In the second system of equations the outcome varies linearly with the
ratio of forces, so this rule is called linear law.
Lanchester’s model of attritions has been reinterpreted and extended to the
conflict among social animals such as fire ants (Adams and Mesterton-Gibbons,
2003; Plowes and Adams, 2005) and early human lethal conflict (Bingham, 1999,
2000). Through examination of various paleontological and archaeological evidence,
Bingham (1999, 2000) argues that early humans developed a remote killing compe-
tence, and so Lanchester’s square law describes well the conflict situation between
punishers and cheaters in non-kin cooperation.
Adams and Mesterton-Gibbons (2003) point out that (1) Lanchester’s equations
assume that the death rate of one side is not directly affected by the fighting ability
of its own army, and (2) the square law and the linear law tend to be mixed. They
suggest a kind of interpolation between the two types of Lanchester’s equations:
dx
dt
= − κ
φλ−1
x2−θy,
dy
dt
= − φ
κλ−1
xy2−θ
for some constants λ, θ. We easily see that the specific choices of λ and θ would
reproduce either square law version equations or linear law equations. For the em-
pirical test of Lanchester’s theory, Engel (1954) and Samz (1972) verify Lanchester’s
law using actual combat data of Iwo Jima during World War II.
Since Lanchester’s equations predict the outcome of battles on the square of
the ratio of contenders’ forces, the ratio of combat power is a determinant of the
outcome of the battle. Because of its deterministic nature the contest success
function associated with Lanchester’s theory may be regarded as a step function,
which gives the side with larger forces 100% probability of winning (Hirshleifer,
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1989). From a different perspective the defining feature of conflict, as opposed to
other activities such as production and cooperation, is that one side’s resources
devoted to conflict weaken and reduce the adversary’s resources. So we can regard
Lanchester’s equations as a prototype of modeling of attrition arising from various
conflict situations (Hirshleifer, 1991).
As we have seen, to describe the technology two forms of contest success func-
tions are frequently used. However, there is an issue of “appropriateness of a contest
success function for any particular contest situation”, and thus “finding ways to
discriminate among functional forms empirically would be a complementary and
welcome endeavor” as Skaperdas (1996) writes at the end of the paper (Skaperdas,
1996, p.638). Considering the fact that the two forms show different analytical
properties in the same conflict models (Hirshleifer, 1989, 1991), to discriminate
between and compare these two forms is crucial. This is the main topic of the first
essay, which provides a plausible generalization of the two existing forms.
Lanchester’s equations provide a direct description of the conflict process, in
which the attrition of fighting ability of contending sides occurs. Researchers,
especially in biology, have extended Lanchester’s theory to explaining the behavior
of animals including early humans. The second essay of the dissertation develops
the idea that conflict between punishers and defectors in a public good game can be
favorable for the support of cooperation in large groups. Particularly, we propose
a formal model to appraise this argument and identify conditions for large group
advantages. In the final essay we address conflict and cooperation from a slightly
different perspective: conflict and cooperation associated with class alliances and
oppositions in a society. This approach follows the view of conflict in terms of
bargaining process (Schelling, 1980).
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1.2 Main Results
The first essay concerns technical aspects of conflict theories. The main purpose
of this essay is twofold: (1) to propose and derive a new family of contest success
functions, which provides a generalization of the two existing forms and (2) to
estimate the new contest success function using actual battle data. The new form of
contest success functions generalizes the existing ones, having each as limiting cases.
We provide two derivations: axiomatic derivation and probabilistic derivation.
The essence of axiomatic derivation is that the new form preserves and inher-
its one of the common properties of two contest success functions − a constant
elasticity of augmentation, which we will define more precisely in the text. We
argue that the degree of overvaluing or undervaluing of success probabilities can
be measured by this elasticity. So in effect we show that the two forms of contest
success functions belong to one family.
In addition we provide a probabilistic derivation of this form following McFad-
den (1974) and Jia (2008). Using a simple conflict model we study an equilibrium
when the contest success function is given by this new form, and show that the
solution corresponds to an interpolation between the ratio form and the difference
form, as we expect.
Empirical studies of contest success functions are rare; Jia (2006) tries to es-
timate the ratio form and difference form of contest success functions using NBA
data, but his work is incomplete. Dobson, Goddard, and Stahler (2008) use data
from English soccer games to estimate Tullock’s contest model. However, their
main focus is to estimate equilibrium effort levels in Tullock’s model, not to es-
timate contest success functions. We estimate various forms of contest success
functions to see which form is more empirically probable using war data− battles
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in the seventeenth-century European wars and World War II. The advantage of us-
ing war data is that the data has a natural candidate for a variable that measures
effort or resources, namely the number of combatants.
In the second essay we explore the application of conflict theory to the collective
action problem in large groups. Since the publication of Logic of Collective Action
by Mancur Olson, the theory of groups and the collective action in a group have
been an intriguing research topic in social sciences. Collective action encompasses
various activities ranging from the provision of public goods to political demonstra-
tions. Through the prisoner’s dilemma framework, an intrinsic logic of resolution
of collective action problems provides solutions to the puzzle of evolution of human
cooperation and vice versa.
We examine critically the traditional understanding of the role of large groups
in collective action when members of the population punish defectors in the public
good game. Particularly, we focus on describing conflict technology using Lanch-
ester’s equations. The idea of using Lanchester’s equations in the collective action is
not new; biologists have been applying Lanchester’s law to collective action among
animals. For example, Franks and Partridge (1993) use Lanchester’s square law to
explain why predatory army ants rely on large numbers of workers that are smaller
than their prey.
In the context of human collective action problems, Bingham (1999, 2000) invoke
Lanchester’s square law to claim that the cost of punishment decreases exponen-
tially as the number of punishers becomes larger. He argues that the remote killing
ability of humans and their precursors − the special capacity of the human species
to kill at a distance from its target − enables a large number of punishers to attack
a single cheater simultaneously, and hence Lanchester’s square law applies.
We observe that Bingham’s point is valid in the situation where a large number
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of punishers face a single cheater, and that the Lanchester effect depends on the
existence of a large number of punishers in his argument. Because the number of
punishers is not always large in a large group, it is not clear whether the same
argument can carry over to the collective action problem in large groups. In addi-
tion, even though the remote killing ability is developed, when the same number
of punishers and cheaters engage in conflict, there is no reason to expect that only
punishers can concentrate on attacking. Thus the remote killing competence is a
necessary condition for the large group effect, but not sufficient; we need to find
some conditions to ensure that a larger number of punishers confront less cheaters
in fighting such as the collective punishment by punishers (Boehm, 1982).
We develop a simple model of n−prisoner dilemma with punishment, which
combines the standard evolutionary model of three behavioral types − cooperator,
punisher, and defector − with the Lanchester-type conflict between punishers and
defectors. By modeling this technology and incorporating individual members’
choice of behavioral types, we show that as long as the defector is, even slightly, less
collective than the punisher, the large group effect pervades. So we may conclude
that the large group effect is quite robust, considering the fact that the defectors,
because of their behavioral predisposition, would be reluctant to cooperate in any
kind of collective action.
Of course this argument does not assert that larger groups are always successful
in collective action; larger groups may have other disadvantages − for instance,
higher coordination costs and information costs. However by providing one instance
of large-group advantages, we verify that the Olsonian view of collective action and
group size does not always provide a correct answer. Moreover, an appropriately
modified theory including coordination costs, we believe, would provide some keys
to interesting questions of group and collective action, such as the determination
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of the optimal size of a group.
The final essay addresses class alliances and conflict in a society. Understanding
interactions within groups and among groups in a society is the key to explaining
important social changes, as Kindleberger (1951) suggests. Social scientists, such as
Gerschenkron (1943), Moore (1965), Gourevitch (1977), Bowles (1984) and Lueb-
bert (1991), have emphasized the role of class alliances and conflict, or more gener-
ally coalition formations among various classes in explaining institutional changes
in the late nineteenth-century Europe.
In Germany, according to Moore (1965), the Junkers successfully formed an
alliance with independent peasants and capitalists in big industries and repressed
industrial workers. Moore’s theory emphasizes the success or failure of compromise
between the ruling classes and the role of peasants in political transitions. Further-
more, the working class in the nineteenth-century German society was stronger and
better-organized than those in other countries. The question of coalition formation
is more interesting if one asks how such a strong working class was excluded from
the major coalition, the so-called solidarity bloc, and ended up being politically
unsuccessful.
We consider four classes - the capitalists, the workers, the landlords and the
peasants - which are commonly considered important actors in the economic or
political arena. As Basu (1986) points, economic and political problems have been
examined primarily within the context of a dyadic relationship, i.e. between two
actors. However, when two different categories of groups are considered, subgroups
within these groups may have both common interests and conflicts. Appropriative
activity by a ruling class of capitalists and landlords gives rise to class conflict be-
tween the ruling class and the ruled class which consists of the peasants and the
workers. The struggle over the relative price between the goods of urban manufac-
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turing sector and the products of the agricultural sector can divide the ruling and
ruled classes and unite the capitalists and the workers; opposition occurs between
urban population and rural population.
Using coalitional game theory we study the various conditions for coalition for-
mation among these classes, such as the relative political strength of each class and
the degree of economic conflict among classes. We show that when economic con-
flict over tariffs and the rate of appropriation escalates and one class is politically
superior to others, the exclusion of that class might occur. So the originally strong
class can end up being disadvantaged. Though in general the initially more ad-
vantaged group is believed to remain more successful economically and politically,
this need not be the case when the various common interests and conflicts cross
and intertwine. The checks and balances among the four classes may lead to this
paradoxical outcome.
1.3 Future Research Agendas
The derivation of contest success functions has been either axiomatic or prob-
abilistic, and neither of these approaches is based on a concrete model of conflict
processes or conflict situations. On the other hand, Lanchester’s equations de-
scribe a concrete situation, a combat between two firing armies. We note that
Lanchester’s ordinary difference equations can be understood as approximations of
underlying stochastic environments. This approximation is known to give a good
prediction when the sizes of engaging armies are large and when the match is not
evenly balanced(Kingman, 2002; Darling and Norris, 2008). In this sense Hirsh-
leifer’s assertion on the correspondence between the step-shaped contest success
functions and Lanchester’s equations can be misleading.
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Stochastic Lanchester models have been used extensively in the operation re-
search literature (See McNaught, 1999). A Markov chain obtained from this stochas-
tic model has multiple absorbing states − the states in which one of the engaging
sides has zero fighters. So we can calculate probabilities of the chain reaching one
of these absorbing states, and by aggregating these probabilities we can obtain
winning probabilities for each engaging side.
We may derive explicit formulas for these winning probabilities, and study the
relationship between these formulas and the existing contest success functions. In
addition we can explore the effect of combat effectiveness and the effect of splitting
of initial forces on these probabilities, and hence on corresponding contest success
functions.
Furthermore, we recall that conflict is the situation whereby one party devotes
resources in order to reduce or offset opponents’ resources: for example, eliminating
the other side’s combatants in battles or working hard to press the opposition and
make tackles in a soccer game. In this interpretation the definition of conflicts
covers strikes, promotional competitions, lawsuits, athletic competitions, and R&D
races. Through promotional competitions, firms spend resources on advertising to
affect their market share. If we interpret the winning probabilities as a share of
income or profit, promotional competitions provide an example of contests. With
this connection, the contest technology, or the technology of conflict in these various
contexts may relate to the attrition process described by Lanchester’s equation or
its proper extensions.
Regarding collective action in large groups, the key source of large group advan-
tage is Lanchester’s square law. As we easily verify from the shape of the quadratic
functions, this effect can be regarded as an acceleration effect, which was observed
and studied by many economists. Schelling asserts this effect is ubiquitous in so-
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cial behavior (Schelling, 1978, p.33), so we may observe a Lanchester-type effect in
other various social interactions or contexts. If successful, we believe this research
will contribute to a better understanding of the nature of conflict technologies,
the connection between conflict situations and contest success functions, and the
relationship between conflict technologies and other social phenomena.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTIONS:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
Conflict theory has received growing attention in various disciplines. Economists
have examined various aspects and implications of appropriation, a typical example
of conflicting economic interests, in rent-seeking models (Tullock, 1980; Hirshleifer,
1989). Political scientists, focusing on political turmoil such as war, civil war and
demonstration, have scrutinized the effects of conflictual outcomes on political tran-
sitions and political systems (Kalyvas, Balcelles, and Rohner, 2008). More impor-
tantly early human lethal conflict is being recognized as a key factor in explaining
human cooperation in evolutionary biology (Bowles, 2008; Choi and Bowles, 2007;
Garcia and Bergh, 2008).
In these studies the technology of conflict is usually described by a function
called the contest success function. A contest is “a game in which participants
expend resources on arming so as to increase their probability of winning if conflict
were to actually take place” (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2006, p.1) and contest suc-
cess functions show how probabilities of winning depend on the resources devoted
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to conflict. Two well-known forms of contest success functions predict contest out-
comes from the difference between resources of each side and from the ratio of
resources.
In spite of the frequent use of the two different forms of contest success functions,
there is no agreement on which form better represents the technology of conflict.
Jack Hirshleifer points out that the ratio form has the impractical implication
that a side investing zero effort loses everything as long as the opponents spend a
small amount of resources (Hirshleifer, 1989, 1991). However, since the difference
form does not admit the existence of an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in widely used conflict models, the ratio form is more commonly used. One of the
few attempts to empirically estimate these functions is Jia (2006), who estimates
the ratio form and difference form of contest success functions using NBA data.
However, the work is incomplete.
In this chapter we present an integrated form of contest success functions which
has the ratio form and the difference form as limiting cases and study the analytical
properties of this form. We also estimate different contest success functions using
war data, which provides a natural candidate for a variable that measures effort or
resources, namely the number of combatants.
To compare these two common functions we consider the following example. For
concreteness we use the language of military combat, following (Hirshleifer, 1991).
Suppose p is the winning probability of side 1 when two fighters of side 1 face one
fighter of side 2, denoted by (2, 1).We ask the following question: when a thou-
sand and one fighters of side 1 contend with a thousand fighters of side 2, namely
(1001, 1000), should we still assign the same value of p to the winning probability
of side 1? Similarly, if the number of fighters of side 1 and side 2 are 2000 and 1000
respectively, would p be the correct probability of side 1’s winning in (2000, 1000)?
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One may argue that because the importance of one more fighter becomes smaller
as the total number of fighters grows, we should assign a probability less than p to
(1001, 1000). Regarding the case (2000, 1000), one may think that the effectiveness
of fighting ability may increase faster as fighter size increases, so side 1 can have a
higher probability of winning in (2000, 1000) (see Lanchester, 1916, for example).
The problem is that in analysis one necessarily chooses one specific form of
contest success, equivalent to choosing one interpretation of these functions, even
though we do not have a good answer to the above questions. The main purpose of
this chapter is to define a new contest success function which provides more flex-
ibility in specification than the existing forms. Section 2 provides the derivation,
which closely resembles that of a CES production function (Arrow, Chenery, Min-
has, and Solow, 1961). The probabilistic derivation, like McFadden (1974) and Jia
(2008), is also provided. We examine the existence of pure strategy interior Nash
equilibrium. In section 3 we present the empirical estimation of various contest
success functions using battle data of seventeenth-century Europe and World War
Two.
2.2 Integrated Form
2.2.1 Derivation
We present the difference form and the ratio form of contest success functions
(Hirshleifer, 1989) . Denoting the resources or fighting effort devoted to a contest
by side 1 and side 2 by x1 and x2 respectively and winning probabilities of side 1
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and side 2 by u(x1, x2) and v(x1, x2), we have
Difference : ud(x1, x2) =
exp (κx1)
exp (κx1) + exp (κx2)
for 0 ≤ x1, x2
vd(x1, x2) =
exp (κx2)
exp (κx1) + exp (κx2)
for 0 ≤ x1, x2
Ratio : ur(x1, x2) =

(x1)
κ
(x1)
κ+(x2)
κ if 0 < x1 or 0 < x2
1
2
if x1 = 0 and x2 = 0
vr(x1, x2) =

(x2)
κ
(x1)
κ+(x2)
κ if 0 < x1 or 0 < x2
1
2
if x1 = 0 and x2 = 0
The superscript, d or r, indicates the difference or the ratio form. It is clear
from the specifications that the difference form gives the probabilities of winning
based on the difference in resources x1−x2 since ud(x1, x2) = 11+exp(−κ(x1−x2)) , while
the winning probability in the ratio form depends only on the ratio, x1/x2, because
ur(x1, x2) =
1
1+(x2/x1)
κ . We also note that the ratio form of contest success functions
is not continuous at (0,0) which accounts for the impossibility of having (0,0) as
Nash equilibrium in a conflict model. We will discuss this more precisely in section
3.2.2.
We note that in the example given in the introduction to this chapter, the
ratio of the increase in fighters of side 1, necessary to keep the winning probability
constant, to the corresponding increase in fighters of side 2 captures the degree of
overvaluing (or undervaluing) of the winning probability. Specifically we compute
case 1: ratio of fighters’ increases =
1001− 2
1000− 1 ≈ 1 (2.1)
case 2: ratio of fighters’ increases =
2000− 2
1000− 1 ≈ 2 (2.2)
Motivated by this we define a new rate which can serve as a measure comparing two
forms of contest success functions and call this the marginal rate of augmentation
(MRA). This measure shows the quantity of additional resources side 1 needs to
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augment its existing resources to keep the winning probability a constant against
an increase in other side’s resources. More precisely if we consider the level set of
side 1’s contest success function u¯ = u(x1, x2) and use the notation x2 = x2(x1)
such that u¯ = u(x1, x2(x1)), MRA is the slope of x2(x1):
MRA :=
dx2
dx1
= −ux2
ux1
(2.3)
So if MRA is high more resources should be devoted to obtain the same success
probability. Using MRA we now define an elasticity of augmentation as follows:
elasticity of augmentation (ρ) (2.4)
=
percentage increase in MRA
percentage increase in relative size of contestants’ resources
(2.5)
=
d ln(−ux2/ux1)
d ln(x1/x2)
where ux1 = ∂u/∂x1, ux2 = ∂u/∂x2
The elasticity of augmentation is a normalized percentage increase in MRA and
since u + v = 1, we can also write ρ =
d ln(vx2/ux1 )
d ln(x1/x2)
. When ρ is low we expect that
side 1 would need to augment its resources by a smaller amount to keep up the
same success probability. This may correspond to the situation described by the
difference form. On the other hand a high ρ implies that side 1 should extend its
resources by greater amounts to gain the same success probability. This situation
is possibly captured by the ratio form. By simple calculation we verify that for the
difference form the elasticity is 0 of augmentation whereas for the ratio form the
elasticity is 1.
On the other hand the parameter κ in the difference form and ratio form is “mass
effect parameter scaling the decisiveness of fighting effort disparities” (Hirshleifer,
1991) and measures the slope of the contest success function in even matching −
the contest where x1 = x2. By computing the marginal winning probabilities in
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even matching for the difference form and the ratio form,
∂ud
∂x1
= κud(1− ud), ∂u
r
∂x1
=
κ
x1
ur(1− ur)
we see that ∂ud/∂x1 = ∂u
r/∂x1 =
κ
4
if x1 = x2 = 1. Since we would like to find
an interpolation between the difference form and the ratio form with a constant
elasticity of augmentation we require this probability to equal κ
4
at x1 = 1 in the
newly derived function. With these parameters, we have proposition 2.1:
Proposition 2.1 Suppose we have the following equations:
d ln(−ux2/ux1)
d ln(x1/x2)
= ρ for x1, x2 ≥ 0 (2.6)
ux1(x1, x2) =
κ
4
for x1 = x2 = 1 (2.7)
u(x1, x2; ρ) =
fρ(x1)
fρ(x1) + fρ(x2)
(2.8)
where 0 ≤ ρ, ρ 6= 1, κ > 0 and fρ(0) > 0, fρ is increasing and differentiable for
x1, x2 ≥ 0. Then equation (2.9) is a unique solution satisfying (2.6), (2.7), and
(2.8)
u(x1, x2; ρ) =
exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1
)
exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1
)
+ exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
2
) for 0 ≤ ρ < 1 (2.9)
Moreover we have
u(x1, x2; 0) = u
d(x1, x2) and u(x1, x2; ρ)→ ur(x1, x2) as ρ→ 1 (2.10)
Proof. By rearranging (2.6) we obtain
c(x1)
ρux1 + (x2)
ρux2 = 0 for some c 6= 0 (2.11)
Using (2.8) and (2.11) we find
c(x1)
ρf ′ρ(x1)fρ(x2)− (x2)ρfρ(x1)f ′ρ(x2) = 0 for x1, x2 ≥ 0 (2.12)
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By evaluating (2.12) at x1 = x2 > 0 we conclude c = 1. We set x2 = 1 in (2.12)
and find
f ′ρ(x1)
fρ(x1)
=
f ′ρ(1)
fρ(1)
1
xρ1
(2.13)
and using (2.7) we see that f ′ρ(1)/fρ(1) = κ. Then by solving (2.13) we obtain
u(x1, x2; ρ) =
exp(κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1 )
exp(κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1 ) + exp(κ
1
1−ρx
1−ρ
2 )
So we have u(x1, x2; 0) = u
d(x1, x2) and the fact that u(x1, x2; ρ) → ur(x1, x2) as
ρ→ 1 follows from an application of L’Hopital’s rule. 
We call u(x1, x2; ρ) in (2.9) an integrated form of contest success function and
write uρ(x1, x2) := u(x1, x2; ρ). According to proposition 2.1 an integrated contest
success function equals the difference form when ρ = 0 and approaches the ratio
form as ρ→ 1. Skaperdas (1996) shows that a function of the form (2.8) satisfies
the desirable axioms of contest success function, where the desirable axioms in-
clude monotonicity, anonymity, and independence from irrelevant alternatives (see
Skaperdas, 1996, pp.284-286, for the definitions of axioms). Hence by proposition
2.1 we also conclude that the integrated form is a unique function which satisfies the
properties of (2.6, 2.7) and the desirable properties of a contest success function,
which provides an axiomatic characterization of the new integrated form. Figure
1 depicts the level sets of the integrated form, difference form, and ratio form. As
we expect the integrated form describes the intermediate levels of probabilities be-
tween the difference form and the ratio form.
Next we consider the probabilistic derivation of the integrated form. We write
X ∼ F (s) to indicate that the distribution of a random variable, X, is F (s), and
recall X follows Gumbel type (type I) extreme value distribution if X ∼ exp(−e−κs)
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Figure 1. Comparison of contest success functions.
Each line shows the combinations of x1 and x2 small at which side 1’s winning probability is 0.4.
We use the values, κ = 1, ρ = 0.3.
and Fre´chet type (type II) extreme value distribution if X ∼ exp(−s−κ), where κ
is a positive constant. We suppose the result of a contest depends on performance,
hi , and performance is in turn determined by xi and a random factor is i: i.e.
hi = hi(xi, i) (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2006; Jia, 2008). If the specification of
performance is in additive form, hdi = xi+ i and i follows a type III extreme value
distribution, the difference form of the contest success function equals Pr{hd1 > hd2}
(McFadden, 1974). A similar derivation for the ratio form was not available until
Jia (2008).
Jia (2008) shows that when i follows a type I extreme value distribution and
the specification of performance is in multiplicative form, hri = xii,the ratio form
of contest success function can be derived from Pr {hr1 > hr2}. Now we suppose
that hi(ρ) =
x1−ρi −1
1−ρ +
1−ρi −1
1−ρ . Then it is easy to see that Pr{h1(0) > h2(0)} =
Pr{hd1 > hd2} and Pr{h1(1) > h2(1)} = Pr{hr1 > hr2}, where we use notations:
hi(1) = limρ→1 hi(ρ).
Since we have Pr{x1 + 1 < x2 + 2} = Pr{1 − 2 < x2 − x1} for given x1 and
x2, McFadden (1974)’s results is obtained by showing that 1 − 2 ∼ Λ(s) for i ∼
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exp(−e−κs), where Λ(s) = 1
1+e−s . Similarly because Pr{x11 < x22} = Pr{log 1−
log 2 < log x2− log x1} holds, Jia’s derivation is equivalent to showing that log 1−
log 2 ∼ Λ(s) for i ∼ exp(−s−κ). Proposition 2.2 provides the generalization of
these derivations. In the proposition we use the following definition of the rational
power of real numbers, s
n
m , for m,n natural numbers
s
n
m :=
 (
m
√
s)n if s ≥ 0
−( m√−s)n if s < 0
(2.14)
where m
√
s, for s > 0, denotes a unique positive real number y such that ym = s.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that ρ = 1 − n
m
, m, n are natural numbers such that
m > n and 1, 2 ∼ F (s) i.i.d and F (s) = exp
(
−e−κ 11−ρ s1−ρ
)
for −∞ < s < ∞
and hi(ρ) :=
x1−ρi −1
1−ρ +
1−ρi −1
1−ρ . Then
Pr{h1(ρ) > h2(ρ)} =
exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1
)
exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1
)
+ exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
2
)
Proof. From (2.14) we see that 1
1−ρs
1−ρ is continuous, increasing and 1
1−ρs
1−ρ →
−∞ as s → −∞ and 1
1−ρs
1−ρ → ∞ as s → ∞. Since Pr{h1(ρ) > h2(ρ)} =
Pr{ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1 − 11−ρx1−ρ2 > 11−ρ1−ρ2 − 11−ρ1−ρ1 },in the view of McFadden (1974) (or
lemma in the appendix) it is enough to show that 1
1−ρ
1−ρ
1 ∼ G(s), G(s) =
exp(−e−κt). Again from (2.14) and the definition of F (s) we have
Pr{ 1
1− ρ
1−ρ
1 < s} = Pr{1 <
( n
m
s
)m
n }
= exp(−e−κs)

We note that the distribution function F (s) does not possess a continuous den-
sity since F (s) is not differentiable at 0. Moreover if 1, 2 ∼ Fi(s) independently
25
and Fi(s) = exp
(
−γie−κ
1
1−ρ s
1−ρ)
, from Lemma 1 in the appendix we have
Pr{h1 > h2} =
γ1 exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1
)
γ1 exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1
)
+ γ2 exp
(
κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
2
) (2.15)
and as ρ → ∞, (2.15) approaches a generalized ratio form (see Jia, 2008) . Thus
γ1 represents the relative fighting effectiveness of side 1 against side 2 (see Dupuy,
1987; Kalyvas, Balcelles, and Rohner, 2008).
2.2.2 Existence of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Despite the fact that both the ratio form and the difference form have their
respective analytical advantages, the ratio form of contest success function is more
commonly used since this form admits an interior Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
for the frequently-used conflict model (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2006). We study
the condition of ρ for an integrated form which allows the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium using a simple conflict model in this section (Hirshleifer, 1989; Garfinkel
and Skaperdas, 2006). Assume side 1 and side 2 have resources x1 and x2, where
x1, x2 ∈ [0, x¯] and x¯ ≥ 1, and they compete for a prize of the value 2x¯, the sum
of total available resources. The costs of competing are resources devoted to the
contest, so we write the expected payoffs for side 1 and side 2:
pi1(x1, x2) = 2x¯ uρ (x1, x2)− x1 (2.16)
pi2(x1, x2) = 2x¯ vρ(x1, x2)− x2 (2.17)
and suppose ρ ∈ [0, 1).In the model with uρ being replaced by the ratio form ur in
(2.16) and (2.17) , (x1, x0) = (0, 0) cannot be a Nash equilibrium since an arbitrary
small increase in resources from 0 will raise the winning probability from 0.5 to 1
and hence the marginal winning probability at 0 is infinity (Hirshleifer, 1989). This
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is one of the main reasons why Hirshliefer criticizes the ratio form: peace is never
observed as an equilibrium outcome.
We look for a symmetric interior pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Denoting
such an equilibrium by (x∗1, x
∗
2), we find the first order condition for the interior
best response of side 1, xBR1 given x2.
2κx¯
1
(xBR1 )
ρ
u(xBR1 , x2)(1− u(xBR1 , x2))− 1 = 0 (2.18)
At a symmetric equilibrium, u(xBR1 , x2) =
1
2
. Had we used the difference form
instead of the integrated form or set ρ = 0, the left hand side of (2.18) would have
not depended on x1. Because of this an interior symmetric equilibrium generally
fails to exist in the difference form, and this accounts for the more popular use of
the ratio form in the conflict model.
In the integrated form, if a symmetric equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) exists, from (2.18)
x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
(κx¯
2
) 1
ρ
(2.19)
To simply the analysis we assume κx¯ < 2 and pi′′∗(t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, x¯] where
pi∗(t) := 2x¯ u (t, x∗2) − t. The first assumption, κx¯ < 2, guarantees x∗1 =
(
κx¯
2
) 1
ρ <
κx¯
2
< x¯ and pi′′∗(t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, x¯] ensures that pi∗(t) achieves the global maximum
at x∗1. With these two assumptions x
∗
1 = x
∗
2 =
(
κx¯
2
) 1
ρ is indeed a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium and we note that the solution x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
(
κx¯
2
) 1
ρ is a generalization
of the solution in the case of the ratio form (For example, see equation (10) in
Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2006).
Moreover we verify that limρ→0 x∗1 = 0; in the limiting case approaching the
difference form, an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium converges to 0 and this
shows one instance where there is no interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
difference form. So we conclude that under reasonable conditions the integrated
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Figure 2. Existence of an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We draw side 1’s best response (thick line), side 2’s best response (thick dashed line), side 1’s
indifference curves (thin line) in each panel. We use values, κ = 1, x¯ = 1. From the shape of
indifference curves we see that pi′′∗ (t) < 0 for all t.
form of the contest success function allows an interior pure strategy Nash equilibria
for all ρ > 0. In figure 2 we present a numerical example of this analysis.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
Since we do not have an a priori answer as to which form of contest success
function is more plausible, we conduct an empirical analysis. As arms race and
wars are the most important and obvious examples of conflictual contest (for var-
ious forms of conflict, see Konrad (2007)), we believe that the estimation of our
contest success function using war data would provide meaningful estimates of the
parameters, ρ and κ.
2.3.1 Estimation Method
We use battle data from the seventeenth century European wars in Bodart
(1908, pp. 49-177) and from World War II in Dupuy (1987, pp. 293-295). Military
combat, a violent, planned form of physical interaction between two hostile oppo-
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nents, has a natural hierarchy: war, campaign, battle, engagement, action, and
duel (Dupuy, 1987). Among these we consider two levels of military combat: war
and battle. A war is an armed conflict or a state of belligerence usually lasting for
months or years while a battle involves combat between two armies with specific
missions, normally lasting one or two days. The seventeenth century European
wars data covers 315 battles with each battle corresponding to one observation in
our data. Each observation has a record of the winner, the loser, and the total
numbers of personnel in winning and losing armies.
We note that data on each battle gives two pieces of information: the winning
probability of the winner and the losing probability of the loser. Because of this
difficulty in interpretation we consider two constructions of the data set from the
original battle data. In the first construction − the case presented in the text − we
associate each battle data with either a winning event or a losing event depending
on a random draw from a fair coin. Alternatively we expand the original battle
data by associating both winning and losing events to each battle, hence obtaining
a new data set with 630 observations. In this case, presented in the appendix, we
correct the standard errors by clustering battles. We provide descriptive statistics
for European battles in the appendix.
Denoting the indicator of winning by yi we use the following econometric model:
yi ∼ Bernoulli(pii) (2.20)
(D) pii = F (κ(x1i − x2i) + β1 + β2Darmy i + β3Dwar i)
(R) pii = F (κ(lnx1i − lnx2i) + β1 + β2Darmy i + β3Dwar i)
(I) pii = F (η(x
1−ρ
1i − x1−ρ2i ) + β1 + β2Darmy i + β3Dwar i)
where F (s) = 1
1+e−s , Darmy, Dwar are dummy variables indicating the identity of
armies and the kind of wars (see appendix).
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The specifications of models in equation (2.20) are the direct consequence of propo-
sition 2.2 and dummy variables control for combat effectiveness (or ineffectiveness)
due to the identity of armies or the specificity of the war. Indeed using F (s) and
η = κ
1−ρ we can write model (I) as
pii =
expβ1+β2Darmy i+β3Dwar i exp(κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1i )
expβ1+β2Darmy i+β3Dwar i exp(κ 1
1−ρx
1−ρ
1i ) + exp(
1
1−ρx
1−ρ
2i )
so we can regard the part expβ1+β2Darmy i+β3Dwar i as normalized γi,
γ1
γ2
, in (2.15).
We also note that model (D) is a standard logit regression and model (R) is a logit
regression with the data log-transformed. So model (D), (R), and (I) estimate
the difference form, the ratio form, and the integrated form, respectively. We esti-
mate each parameter using the maximum likelihood method, which is the standard
method in estimating logit models. We could not estimate the difference form and
the integrated form in the case of World War II data since the data provides only
the ratio of combat powers.
2.3.2 Estimation Results
In table 1 we note that all coefficients of κ in the difference and the ratio forms
are estimated to be positive, which shows that one side’s winning probability is
an increasing function of that side’s own effort. For the integrated form we can
recover implied κ = 2.28009, using the relation κ = (1 − ρ)η. To compare κ′s in
each model we compute one side’s marginal winning probability at even matching
when the number of combatants is half of its total available resources ; i.e. if
we denote the total available resources by x¯, this marginal winning probability is
1
4
κ
(x¯/2)ρ
. Since the mean number of combatants in the seventeenth century European
war data is 21,035 (see appendix), we can use this number as a proxy for x¯
2
. We
may interpret these numbers as follows: in response to an increase of 10,000 in
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17C European War World War II
Difference Ratio Integrated Ratio
κ 1.98× 10−5 0.70377 3.41982
(9.32× 10−6) (0.120365) (0.6776)
η −18.19199
(6.4571)
ρ 1.125335
(0.21571)
Number of 315 315 315 188
Observations
Percentage of 65.40 67.62 67.30 84.04
Correctly Predicted
Log-likelihood Value −200.8481 −188.23251 −188.0628 −70.6855
Table 1. Estimation of contest success functions.
All estimates are significant at 99% level. We use dummy variables of armies and wars in European
war estimation and dummy variables of armies indicating either Allied forces or German forces
in World War II data. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
the number of combatants (from 21,035 original combatants), the difference form,
the ratio form, and integrated form predict increases in the winning probabilities
by 4.95%, 8.36%, 7.78% respectively. In the case of World War II, using the fact
that the average strength of battles is around 14,000 (Dupuy, 1987, pp. 169) we
compute a marginal winning probability ×104 as 2.4472 (or 244.72%) which is a
much larger number than those of the European wars. This fact suggests that
the contest success function for World War II is more non-linear than the one for
D R I
marginal winning probability ×104 0.0495 0.08364 0.077827
Table 2. Estimates of the mass effect parameter
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the seventeenth century European wars and “[T]he tremendous advantage of being
even just a little stronger than one’s opponent”, which is pointed out as one of the
stylized facts of warfare by Hirshleifer (1991, p 131), only appears in World War II
data.
Which form of contest success functions better describes battle? As we see in
Table 1 and the Appendix, our tentative conclusion would be that a contest success
function close to the ratio form would best describe the winning probabilities of
battle. Of course the peculiarity of 17th century European wars or other possible
data problems may have hindered the correct estimation of our model. This prob-
lem, if it exists, can be corrected by extending data sets to cover other kinds of
wars or other forms of conflicts.
2.4 Discussion
In the chapter we have proposed an integrated contest success function which
has the difference form and the ratio form as limiting cases. Also we have derived
this new form from a constant elasticity of augmentation and provided a proba-
bilistic derivation. These results give a generalization of the existing results. In
addition we have shown that the integrated form has desirable analytical properties
which admit an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Regarding the question of
a plausible specification of contest success functions, a tentative conclusion is that
the seventeenth century European wars better fit the ratio form of contest success
functions.
Another way of interpreting the integrated contest success function is the trans-
formation of variables. Since we do not know the exact unit of measure for fighting
effort or resources in various conflict situations, we may interpret the problem of
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choosing contest success functions as a transformation of observables into variables
with correct measurement. In this interpretation, as we have seen in the text, the
difference form with the log transformation corresponds to the ratio form. More
generally, an integrated form of contest success functions arises from a transforma-
tion Xi =
xi−1
1−ρ and the difference form.
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CHAPTER 3
LARGER GROUPS MAY ALLEVIATE THE
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
3.1 Introduction
Provisions of public projects in a community, revolutionary activities to over-
throw corrupt and inefficient governments, and more generally various actions that
members of a group take to achieve a common goal have been examined extensively
by social scientists under the name of collective action. Group size has played an
important role in explaining collective action. A standard argument put forward
by Olson (1965) asserts that a larger group faces more difficulties in achieving a
common goal compared to a smaller group, because of an aggravated free-rider
problem: “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small ... rational,
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests
(Olson, 1965, p.2)”
Since then, studies of the relationship between group size and the provision
of collective goods have been conducted by various researchers (Chamberlin, 1974;
Marwell and Pamela, 1993; McGuire, 1974; Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Sandler, 1992;
Agrawal and Goyal, 2001; Esteban and Ray, 1999). Chamberlin (1974) emphasizes
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the distinction between goods with perfect nonrivalness (“inclusive” goods in Ol-
son’s terms) and goods with rivalness of consumption (“exclusive” goods) among
nonexcludable goods. With this distinction he argues that Olson’s claim that the
larger group would provide fewer public goods only holds for goods with perfect
rivalness. In the case of goods with non-rivalness, Chamberlin shows that as group
size increases, the amount of total contribution, in absolute terms, would increase.
This view that the Olson thesis holds when the collective good is private but may
be reversed when the good is purely public, initiated by Chamberlin and substan-
tiated by others (Chamberlin, 1974; Marwell and Pamela, 1993; McGuire, 1974;
Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Sandler, 1992) is described as “common wisdom” by
Esteban and Ray (2001)
Esteban and Ray (2001), criticizing the notion that this common wisdom only
applies to the extreme case of “purely public” (perfect nonrivalness), examine group
size effect using a model with explicit intergroup conflicts. In particular they show
that under plausible assumptions about costs, the winning probabilities of a large
group is greater than that of a smaller group even if the prize is purely private.
However, the context in which they examine collection action − competition be-
tween several groups − may be more relevant in some instances, but it is neither
a general situation nor the situation that Olson considers. Also, since the notion
that a group provides less amounts of collective goods in absolute terms does not
necessarily coincide with the fact that a group provides a suboptimal amount of
collective goods, the “common wisdom” view is not a complete antithesis of Olson’s
arguments.
A variety of empirical or experimental studies have also examined the group size
hypothesis (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Bagnoli and McKee, 1991; Isaac, Walker, and
Williams, 1994; Hann and Koorema, 2002; Carpenter, 2007) and many of them find
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that “the size of a group is positively related to its level of collective action”(Marwell
and Pamela, 1993, p.38). Hann and Koorema (2002) use data from their study
of a candy bar honor system in 166 firms in the Netherlands and find evidence
that free riding decreases with group size. Carpenter (2007) tests the group size
hypothesis when punishment is allowed and finds that “large groups contribute at
rates no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in
large group” (Carpenter, 2007, p.31) In sum, even though various empirical and
experimental studies suggest that large groups may perform better, few theoretical
works provide the logic and reasoning of how larger groups can overcome their
aggravated free-rider problem. So the question of the relationship between group
size and group’s performance in collective action still remains unanswered.
An interesting connection between group size and collective action has been
raised in evolutionary biology literature in the context of the use of punishment to
explain the evolution of human cooperation (Bingham, 1999, 2000). Paul Bingham
uses Lanchester’s square law to claim that humans’ ability to kill from a distance
decreases the cost of punishment. The crux of Bingham’s argument is that as
the remote killing ability develops a large number of punishers can attack a single
“cheater” simultaneously, and hence the cost of punishment decreases exponen-
tially:
When a large number of individuals - say n - simultaneously attack
a single target, the risk to each is reduced by a factor of n because
the target is incapacitated about n times faster. Moreover, during this
n-fold shorter conflict, the risk to each attacker is further reduced by
a second factor of n because the risk of return fire from the target is
distributed across n attackers. Thus, the total risk to n remote attackers
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is reduced by n2 (Bingham, 2000, p.249).
Although Bingham’s point is valid in the situation where the large number of
punishers face a single cheater, the Lanchester effect − the effect derived from
Lanchester’s square law and explained in the quote − depends on the existence of
large number of punishers. Because the number of punishers is not always large
in a large group, it is not clear whether the same argument can carry over to
the collective action problem with punishment in the large group. In addition,
even though the remote killing ability is developed, when the same number of
punishers and cheaters engage in conflicts, there is no reason to expect the cost
of punishment to decrease exponentially. Thus the remote killing competence is a
necessary condition for the large group effect, but not sufficient; we need to impose
some conditions to ensure that a larger number of punishers confront less cheaters
in fighting such as the collective punishment by punishers (Boehm, 1982).
To explore these questions we develop a simple model of n−prisoner dilemma
with punishment, which combines the standard evolutionary model of three behav-
ioral types − cooperator, punisher, and defector − with the Lanchester-type con-
flict between punishers and defectors (Bowles and Choi, 2002; Bowles and Gintis,
2004; Bingham, 1999, 2000; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004; Sethi and Somanathan,
2006). In the model we introduce a parameter to capture the degree of collec-
tiveness among punishers who engage the defectors, and study the conditions for
large-group advantage. We find that group size has a positive effect in supporting
higher levels of cooperation, so that collective action is more likely to be successful,
as we expect from Bingham’s argument. More interestingly we show that as long as
the defector type is, even slightly, less collective than the punisher type, the large
group effect pervades. Thus, we may conclude that the large group effect is quite
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robust, considering that the defector type, because of its behavioral disposition,
would be reluctant to engage in any type of collective action.
Interestingly Esteban and Ray (2001) emphasize the role of “divide-and-conquer”
which captures exactly the notion that the defector is less collective than the pun-
isher in the punishment process: “Political entities have applied this rule [divide-
and-conquer] with surprising universality, but if smaller groups are more potent,
the division of one’s opponent into a number of smaller units would entail more
effective opposition (Esteban and Ray, 2001, p.664)”
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the existing
research on group size and collective action. Section 3 reminds readers of Lanch-
ester’s equations and Lanchester’s square law. We present a model and results as
well as numerical simulations of the model in the section 4. In section 5 we discuss
implications and extensions of the model.
3.2 Lanchester’s Law and an Illustrating Example
We imagine that x combatants of army A engage army B with y combatants.
Lanchester’s equations (Lanchester, 1916, p.20) read
dx
dt
= −κy, dy
dt
= −φx (3.1)
where κ and φ denote the fighting effectiveness of each army. Equation (3.1) is
derived from the assumption that the number of persons knocked out per unit
time is directly proportional to the numerical size of the opposing force; during
each per unit of time, ∆t, the opposing force of magnitude y concentrates on
the elimination of ∆x, so ∆x = y∆t. Engel (1954) and Samz (1972) verify the
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Figure 3. Solution curves for Lanchester’s equation.
Each line corresponds to each solution of Lanchester’s equation. We set φ = κ = 1
validity of Lanchester’s equation in an actual combat situation where U.S. forces
captured the island of Iwo Jima during World War II. This system (3.1) is called a
Hamiltonian system and the equation for solution orbits is given by
H(x, y) =
φ
2
x2 − κ
2
y2, (3.2)
so if we evaluate H(x, y) at the solutions of ODE the value of (3.2) only depends on
the initial values, H(x∗, y∗) = φ
2
x20 − κ2y20. In this way we obtain the phase diagram
(see figure 3) which describes the time path of each solution.
We adopt the criterion that one army wins the battle if the other army vanishes
first; i.e. army A wins the battle if and only if φx20 > κy
2
0 where x0 and y0 are initial
values for x and y. Similarly, if army B divides evenly and, accordingly, army A
engages twice with half of original army B y0/2, army A wins both battles if and
only if φx20−κ
(
y0
2
)2
> κ
(
y0
2
)2
, where the left hand side represents the square of
remaining combatants in army A after the first engagement. In general when army
B is divided by n we obtain the following rule:
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φx20 > κ
y20
n
(3.3)
Now consider a population which consists of defectors, punishers, and possibly
cooperators. For concreteness, suppose that 50% of the population are defectors.
We assume that the defectors behave individually (divided by n), so y0 = n for
simplicity. A punishment process − where the punishers eliminate defectors and
defectors counteract − is described by Lanchester’s equations with φ = κ. Then
equation (3.3) is reduced to x0 >
√
y0, where x0 and y0 denotes the initial number
of punishers and defectors respectively. First consider the case in which population
size is 20. Since 50% of the population are defectors, or equivalently 10 are defectors
in the population, we need 3.1328 punishers − ignoring the integer problem − to
eliminate defectors. However, if the size of the population is 200, only 10 punishers
is enough for 100 defectors. In other words, when group size is 20, 15% of the
population must be punishers in order to get rid of the defectors, whereas in a
group of size 200 5% of the population will be enough to do this. In short the
technology of punishment exhibits increasing returns to group size.
3.3 Model and Analysis
3.3.1 Model
Consider a population of size n playing a public good game. We suppose that
each member in a population − identified with a player in a public good game −
can choose to be one of three types: cooperator, punisher, and defector. Punishers
(P) contribute to the public project and punish defectors, defectors (D) do not
contribute to the public good, and finally cooperators (C) do not punish, but only
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contribute to the public project. A member chooses types taking account of the
effect of this choice on costs he incurs because of ensuing conflicts, which we call
a punishment process. In the punishment process punishers and defectors have
a series of engagements described by Lanchester’s equations following (Bingham,
1999, 2000). With the notation Ei = 1 if i contributes and Ei = 0 otherwise,
member i’s expected payoffs of each type or evaluation of utility upon adopting
each type reads
pi(P ) =
b
n
∑
Ej +
1
n
− c− dPr(IP ) (3.4)
pi(D) =
b
n
∑
j 6=i
Ej − sPr(ID) (3.5)
pi(C) =
b
n
∑
Ej +
1
n
− c (3.6)
where b denotes a benefit from the public project, 1
n
is the marginal contribution of
contributing type, and c is the cost of contribution. We suppose that c < b < nc,
so in the absence of punishment all members’ contributing is socially optimal while
none of them have enough material motivation to do so when n is sufficiently large.
Term Pr(IP ),which we will specify precisely later, represents the probability with
which punisher i would be injured or hurt during the punishment process and
in which case he pays the cost d. Similarly defector i needs to pay s with the
probability Pr(ID), the probability of defector’s being injured, and we assume that
s > c so the cost that the defector pays in case of being injured − for example a
cost for the recovery of injury or a forgone income from the exclusion of productive
activities because of injury − is greater than per-period contribution cost. We note
when d = s = 0 no punishment takes place and payoffs replicate the n-prisoner
dilemma.
Though we use the language of public goods problems such as cooperator, pun-
isher and defector, we observer that this setting can be readily extended to the sit-
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Figure 4. Defectors’ tendency to act collectively in the punishment.
1/ρ represents the number of defectors who act together in the punishment process. When ρ = 1
all defectors behave individually in the punishing process and as ρ→ 0 cheaters behave more
collectively.
uation of political collective actions (Tullock, 1971; DeNardo, 1985; Epstein, 2002).
In the context of revolutionary activities to overthrow a corrupt and oppressive
government, this setting models an individual’s choice from among three activities:
join the revolutionaries (punisher), join the force of repression (defector), or remain
inactive (cooperator). With these name changes (3.4)∼(3.6) reproduce a similar
specification of expected payoffs that Tullock (1971) used in his study of “paradox
of revolution”.
We proceed to specify terms Pr(IP ) and Pr(IC) using Lanchester’s theory. First
we introduce a parameter ρ to describe the degree of collectiveness of the defectors
in the punishment process:
ρ =
1
the number of defectors who counteract together
Figure 4 illustrates this parameter schematically.
For instance, when the number of punishers and the defectors are x and y = 2021
and ρ = 1/1000, from a similar calculation to that presented in section 3 the
condition for the punishers to defeat “the army of” defectors is as follows:
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x2 ≥ 2× (1000)2 + 212 = [0.001× 2021]× ( 1
0.001
)2 + (2021− 2000)2
where [x ] denotes the integer part of x. The first term, 2 × (1000)2, indicates
that the army of punishers faces 1000 defectors twice and then competes with the
remaining 21 defectors. Thus in general we have the following condition for the
punishers to annihilate all defectors from the population:
φx2 ≥ κ[ρy]
(
1
ρ
)2
+ κ(y − [ρy]1
ρ
)2 (3.7)
where ρ > 0. Since a type is more likely to be injured or knocked out if the result of
the punishment process is close to the defeat of that type, we suppose that Pr(ID)
and Pr(IP ) monotonically depends on (3.7). In particular we suppose that
Pr(ID) = F (φx
2 − κ[ρy]
(
1
ρ
)2
− κ(y − [ρy]1
ρ
)2)
Pr(IP ) = 1− F (φx2 − κ[ρy]
(
1
ρ
)2
− κ(y − [ρy]1
ρ
)2)
where F (t) increasing, lim
t→∞
F (t) = 1, lim
t→−∞
F (t) = 0. For example, we have F (t) =
1[0,∞)(t), or F (t) = 1 if t ≥ 0 , = exp(βt) if t < 0.
3.3.2 Static Analysis
Using the model developed we ask two questions: 1. How does an increase in
group size change piP , piD,and piC given a generation? 2. How does an increase
in group size affect the long-run proportion of each type in the population when
individuals update their types? The first question addresses the static charac-
terization of the model, while the second one refers to the dynamic properties of
the system induced by the model. These two are closely related as the standard
result in game theory suggests − for instance the strict Nash equilibrium in the
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underlying game is an evolutionary stable strategy, hence the asymptotically stable
state in the replicator dynamics (See Weibull, 1995). Concerning the first question
we have proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that α = x
n
, β = y
n
, and s > c. Then for all ρ > 0,
α > 0, β > 0, lim n→∞ (piP − piD) > 0 and lim n→∞ (piC − piD) > 0
Proof. From the definition of Pr(ID) we have
Pr(ID) = F (φα
2n2 − κ[ρβn]
(
1
ρ
)2
− κ(nβ − [ρnβ]1
ρ
)2)
→ 1 as n→∞
Then piC − piD ≥ piP − piD → −c+ s > 0. 
As we see in the proof we have piC − piD ≥ piP − piD,thus whenever piP >
piD playing D is strictly dominated by both strategies C and P. Figure 5 below
characterizes the combinations of population proportion (α, β, 1 − α − β) which
support piP − piD > 0.
In each panel of figure 5 the shaded regions show the population state where
playing defect is strictly dominated by punishers, and hence by cooperators. This
shows the significance of the size of the group. On the other hand when x, y belong
to the unshaded regions, we have Pr(IP ) ≈ 1, Pr(ID) ≈ 0, so piD > piP and piD > piC
for large n; playing defect is individually rational which replicates the conventional
argument for large groups. Because of these payoff structures we may regard the
shaded regions, in a suitable dynamic process, as basins of attraction for some
equilibrium consisting of punishers and cooperators; white regions corresponds to
the basins of attraction for an all-defectors equilibrium. When the size of the group
increases, the shaded region enlarges; being defector becomes less favorable. The
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Figure 5. The fractions of population which supports punishment.
Each point in the triangle uniquely corresponds to one population state, composed of fractions
of each type, through the Bary centric coordinate. For example, the point located on the left
bottom vertex corresponds to a population state in which all individuals choose the defector
type. The points in the shaded area are population states which ensure Pr(IP ) = 1, so
piP − piD > 0. When Pr(IP ) = 1, piP − piD > 0 so in the shaded region playing defect is strictly
dominated. ρ = 0.5, κ = φ, F (t) = 1[0,∞) are used.
static analysis of the payoff structures and the basins of attraction strongly suggests
that cooperation would be supported in the long run.
3.3.3 Dynamic Analysis
We consider a state space Ξn = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3| x+y+z = n }, which is a subset
of a simplex in R3. Assuming that the state at the end of period of t is (x, y, z)
we can write piP (x, y) := piP , piD(x, y) := piD, and piC(x, y) := piC to emphasize the
dependence of payoffs, in particular Pr(IP ) and Pr(ID), on x, y. During the period
t+ 1
D1 A proportion of individuals is drawn from the population at random.
D2 With probability (1 − ) for  ∈ (0, 1), the individuals draw choose types
according to the following switching rule:
type i switch to type j if j ∈ arg max
k
pik(x, y)
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whenever there is a tie between target strategies, an individual is assumed to
choose one randomly from these strategies.
D3 With probability , individuals choose types randomly and the system moves
into the next period.
D2 is called a best response update (Young, 1998; Kandori, Mailath, and Rob,
1993) and the specification of stochastic dynamics follows Young (1998) except D1;
instead of drawing one individual as Young (1998) does, we draw a given proportion
of individuals. If we draw one individual at each period, the convergence speed of
the system to an equilibrium will slow down as n increases, so some positive level
of punishing and cooperating behaviors may persist due simply to the sampling
method. Since we wish to control this artifact and single out the large group effect
from the irrelevant aspects of the modeling, we allow a proportion of individuals to
update their strategies. In step 3, D3, we allow for the possibility of idiosyncratic
behavior such as mistakes by individuals in choosing their best response strategies
following the standard evolutionary model (Young, 1998).
Since the independent randomness, which arises each period both by D1 and
D3, accumulates in the state of the system through time, the system follows a
Markov process and the standard limit theorem for the finite state space applies.
In particular D3 makes the chain irreducible and aperiodic so we have a unique
invariant distribution µ. Since we are interested in the long run equilibrium value
of population fractions, playing cooperators, punishers, and defectors, we esti-
mate lim
t→∞
E(Xt), lim
t→∞
E(Yt),and lim
t→∞
E(Zt) using a Monte Carlo simulation (Madras,
2002). As we do not know an invariant distribution we take the all-defectors state
as an initial state. The state is least likely to support a high level of cooperation
in the system in the long run.
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Figure 6. The fractions of population in each period.
Each point is each state in the simulation. The initial values of states are taken as
α = 0, β = 1, γ = 0. 10% of population are drawn at each period. Other parameters used are
κ = 1, φ = 1, ρ = 0.5, ε = 0.1, b = 10, c = 2, d = 3, s = 3, T = 10000.
Figure 6 depicts trajectories of the states of the system. In the first panel,
where the size of population is relatively small, the population state starting from
all defectors stays close to the all-defectors equilibrium. This may capture the
situation in which all individuals are trapped in the basin of attraction of the
all-defectors equilibrium in figure 5. The second panel shows the case where, as
the basin of attraction for the all-defectors equilibrium shrinks, individuals in the
population manage to escape and hence the higher level of cooperation is supported.
The estimates in table 3 below show the large group effect more precisely.
To estimate the mean fractions and construct the confidence intervals, we fol-
low the batch means method (See Madras, 2002) and choose 25 batches. Also to
n = 90 n = 900
Punisher Defector Cooperator Punisher Defector Cooperator
fraction 0.03362 0.93242 0.03395 0.48231 0.033359 0.484325
95% Conf. [0.031855 [0.929807 [0.032531 [0.480872 [0.03275 [0.48274
Interval 0.0353861] 0.935051] 0.035368] 0.48376] 0.033960] 0.48591]
Table 3. Estimates of mean fractions of population
Estimates of mean fractions of population and 95% confidence interval.The parameters used are
the same as figure 2
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avoid the initialization bias the first five batches have been dropped and Table 3
confirms the large group effect. The main reason is already explained: as the size
of population grows, it becomes easier to prevent the proliferation of defectors with
a smaller fraction of punishers.
3.4 Discussion
We note two features of the model. When ρ → 0, the above argument fails
to hold in the limit. This is because if ρ → 0, meaning the defectors behave
as collectively as the punishers do, the punisher cannot exploit Lanchester’s law.
However proposition 3.1 does hold for all ρ > 0. As long as ρ is strictly greater
than 0 (even if it is very close to 0) or the defector tends to behave less collectively,
the punisher will always enjoy large-group advantages. In addition the result does
not depend on the magnitude of d. This means that, however high the cost of
punishment is, an increase in group size is always in favor of being a punisher or
a cooperator, as the cost of punishment decreases to 0 as n increases. This fact
suggests that the second-order free rider problem can be reduced by the size of the
group (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004).
In sum we show that if the punishment process is well described by Lanchester’s
equations, larger groups may favor cooperation. Of course we do not assert that
larger groups always perform better than smaller groups; we provide one possible
mechanism through which group size can enhance performance in collective action.
We ignore the information costs and coordination problems that larger groups may
suffer. An appropriately modified theory, we believe, would provide some keys to
interesting questions of group size and collective action such as the determination
of the optimal size of groups.
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CHAPTER 4
CLASS ALLIANCES AND CONFLICTS:
AN EXPLANATION OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
4.1 Introduction
Since Karl Marx defined class in terms of ownership and control of the means
of production, many scholars have adopted class as a unit of analysis. Notably
Bowles (1984) studies how the economic relations among various classes can give
rise to class alliances and class conflicts.
Similarly, if renters exchange some of their r-good [agricultural good]
income for c-goods [manufacture good], they have a common interest
with landlords in the relative price of r-goods. Not surprisingly, when
tariff debates have dominated political discourse and organization, as
in Germany before World War I, renter-landlord alliances have been
common (Bowles, 1984, p.113).
Social scientists, such as Gerschenkron (1943), Moore (1965), Kindleberger
(1951), Gourevitch (1977) and Luebbert (1991), have emphasized the role of class
alliances and conflicts, or more generally coalition formation among various classes
49
in explaining important institutional changes in the late nineteenth-century Eu-
rope. According to Moore (1965), in Germany, the Junkers successfully formed an
alliance with independent peasants and capitalists in big industries and repressed
industrial workers. Moore’s theory emphasizes the success or failure of compro-
mise between the ruling classes and the role of the peasant in political transitions.
Class alliances or conflict between different classes can delay democratization or
precipitate it.
The working class in nineteenth-century German society was stronger and better-
organized than those in other countries, as has been suggested by Nolan (1986):
Although Britain experienced the first industrial revolution and France
developed the first significant socialist associations, Germany produced
the largest and best-organized workers’ movement in the late nineteenth
century. By the mid-1890s, German social democracy had successfully
built a mass party and a centralized trade union movement in spite of –
or it could be argued, because of - its espousal of deterministic Marxism,
its practice of ambivalent parliamentarianism and its isolation from the
state and much of society (Nolan, 1986, p.352).
The question of coalition formation is more interesting if one asks how such a
strong working class was excluded from the major coalition, the so-called solidarity
bloc, and ended up being politically unsuccessful. In terms of institutional changes,
Acemoglu and Robinson raise a similar question: “Why in the nineteenth century,
[did] Germany, the country with the most developed socialist party at that time,
institute the welfare state without franchise extension, while Britain and France
extended the franchise?” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, p.1176).
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While the literature, by emphasizing the role of class alliances and conflicts,
provides comprehensive historical description of coalition formation among classes
and its implications for the ensuing political transitions, few of these studies provide
a formal model to explain the coalition formation of classes. This paper proposes a
simple model of coalition formation among four players who have common interests
and conflicts with each other.
As Basu (1986) points out, economic and political problems have been examined
primarily within the context of a dyadic relationship, i.e. between two actors.
However, as history of coalition formation in the nineteenth century European
countries shows, interests and conflict among four classes can be intertwined; the
higher rate of overall exploitation would be of common interest to the capitalist
class and the landed class, whereas these two classes may have a conflict over the
relative price of a industrial product to an agricultural good. The working class and
the peasant class can have similar relationships. We model this tetradic relationship
of common interests and conflicts using the coalition game.
By explicitly introducing a parameter that reflects changes in economic conflict
− such as dramatic changes in trade conditions induced by sudden inflow of cheap
agricultural products from America in the nineteenth century − we study the con-
ditions for forming various coalitions. Specifically we show that when the economic
conflicts over tariffs and the rate of appropriation escalates and one class is polit-
ically superior to others, the exclusion of that class might occur, so the originally
strong class can end up being disadvantaged. Though in general the initially more
advantaged group is believed to remain more successful economically and politi-
cally, this need not be the case when the various common interests and conflicts
cross and intertwine. The checks and balances among the four classes may lead to
this paradoxical outcome.
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A similar result is known as the “segregation of major player” in cooperative
game theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstein, 1944) and the “paradox of voting
power” in the voting literature (Deegan and Packel, 1982), but none of these the-
ories addresses the conflictual aspect of players. In contrast to these models we
show that the interaction between cooperation and conflict among players in the
formation of coalitions yields this paradox. We empirically examine the coalition
formation in nineteenth century Germany and England and assert that the histori-
cal formation of coalitions is congruent with the predictions of the model. Provided
that the solidarity bloc is anti-democratic, through coalition formation this result
also shows a possible link between trade policy and democracy, which is a central
theme of Geschenkron’s Bread and Democracy (Gerschenkron, 1943). Section two
proposes a model and in section three we explain the method of finding equilib-
rium coalition structure and present the main results. Historical reviews follows in
section four and section five summarizes the chapter.
4.2 Model
When two different categories of groups are considered, subgroups within these
groups may have both common interests and conflicts. For example, the divisions
of a society into ruling class versus ruled class, and into urban population versus
rural population, gives rise to relationships among four subgroups, in which each
has both a common interest and conflict with another. Concretely we consider the
capitalist class, the working class, the landlord class, and the peasant class having
common interests and conflicts described by figure 7.
In a society consisting of four classes − a capitalist class, a landlord class,
a working class, and a peasant class − we suppose that there are two modes of
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Relative Price : e.g Tariff
←→
Capitalists Landed Class
Rate of
Appropriation l Real Wage l Rent l
Workers Peasants
Figure 7. Class structure
production, or two distinct production sectors: the manufacturing sector and the
agricultural sector. In the manufacturing sector the capitalists hire the workers,
while the landlords hire the peasants in the agricultural sector and the two sectors
trade their outputs. We suppose that the wage norm and the relative price between
the outputs of the two sectors are the major determinants of the payoffs of each
class. The wage norm ω is a proxy for the (inverse) rate of appropriation (or
exploitation) and the relative price refers to the ratio of the price of agricultural
products to the price of the industrial goods. The reason for workers and peasants
to have a common economic interest in raising ω is that the labor market for
agriculture and manufacturing are related through the pool of the unemployed. By
the working of the pool of the unemployed or “reserve army of labor”, the wage
norm ω determines the overall rate of exploitation in a society and the workers
and the peasants have a common interest in raising ω. Similarly τ, measuring the
relative expensiveness of the agricultural products, yields the conflicting interests
between the manufacturing sector and the agricultural sector. We summarize the
sources of common interests and conflicts in table 4.
We reasonably believe that these kinds of relationships is common in social life.
For example, consider females versus males and Republicans versus Democrats; a
female Republican may share similar political opinions with a male Republican,
but they may conflict on gender issues. Similarly, a female Republican may have
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Common Interest Conflict
Capitalist and Landlord Low ω τ
Capitalist and Worker Low τ ω
Worker and Peasant High ω τ
Landlord and Peasant High τ ω
Table 4. Class conflicts and interests.
common interests in gender issues with a female Democrat, but they may have
conflicting views on political agendas (See Lee and Roemer, 2006). Whenever two
different categories of groups intersect, we can observe a relationship similar to the
one in figure 7.
We use the following payoff structure to capture the conflicts and the common
interests among four classes, focusing on two levels of τ and ω; ωH , ωL, τH , τL. Here
the subscript H (L) indicates “High” (“Low”).
First consider the case of κ = 0 as a benchmarking case. In this case we assign
1 to the most preferred outcome and -1 to the least preferred one as payoffs of
each class, so the capitalist obtains 1 unit of payoff at (τL,ωL) since the pairing
of low relative price and low wage norm, (τL, ωL), is the most preferred outcome.
When the outcome is a mix of the preferred outcome and less preferred outcome, for
example (τH , ωL) and (τL, ωH) for the capitalist, then we simply set the payoff equal
τH ,ωH τH ,ωL τL,ωH τL,ωL
Capitalist −1 κ −κ 1
Landlord −κ 1 −1 κ
Worker κ −1 1 −κ
Peasant 1 −κ κ −1
Table 5. Payoffs for four classes. −1 ≤ κ ≤ 1
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Figure 8. The changes in payoffs for various κ
to 0; i.e. the payoff advantage from the preferred choice exactly offsets the payoff
disadvantage from the less preferred outcome. One may argue that the working
of “reserve army” equalizes the worker’s wage and the peasant wage, hence κ in
(τH , ωH) and (τH , ωL) for workers and peasants would be 1. However, since we wish
to study the class conflict between the working class and the peasants during the
situation like tariff debates we restrict ourselves to payoffs in table 5.
The parameter κ captures the importance of the variables τ and ω in conflicts
and common interests among the four classes. We may describe the conflict over
τ (ω) as the vertical (horizontal) conflict. When κ = 0, the contrast in economic
interests, depending on τ and ω, is most pronounced. On the other hand, if κ = 1,
the relative price does not affect the payoffs of the classes and similarly when
κ = −1, the wage norm is not involved in the determination of payoffs.
Now suppose that each class engages in the formation of coalitions which can
determine the levels of τ and ω. Each class possesses the political resources which
can be used to implement its preferred proposal, such as high relative price or low
wage norm, in the coalition. To represent these resource constraints we suppose
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that each class possesses a certain proportion of total resources: αi for class i
′s po-
litical resources, αi ∈ [0, 1], and
∑
αi = 1. This introduction of political resources
resembles the distinction between de jure political power and de facto political
power in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005).
Here de jure political power refers to power that originates from the
political institutions in society...There is more to political power than
political institutions, however. A group of individuals, even if they are
not allocated power by political institutions, for example as specified in
the constitution, may nonetheless possess political power. Namely, they
can revolt, use arms, hire mercenaries, co-opt the military...We refer to
this type of political power as de facto political power. (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson, 2005, p.4)
The definition of political resources corresponds to de facto political power.
Even though the working class and the peasant class do not have de jure political
power, they may have de facto political power. When classes form a coalition, they
use their de facto political power to achieve a goal. The coalition with aggregate
political resources greater than a certain number, α¯, can be a majority coalition.
We suppose α¯ ∈ [1/2, 1]. If a coalition forms a majority this coalition can choose
one of the proposals which maximizes its payoff and the proposals corresponds to
four alternatives: (τH , ωH), (τH , ωL),(τL, ωH),(τL, ωL).
The worth of the coalition is, by definition, the maximum amount of the payoffs
that the coalition can achieve so we can write the worth of this game as
v(S) =

max
(τ,ω)
∑
i∈Spii(τ, ω) if
∑
i∈S αi > α¯
0 otherwise
(4.1)
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Once a coalition is formed, the coalition will choose (τ, ω) which maximizes the
sum of the players in the coalition, while the other coalition or players which fail
to be a majority simply cannot achieve anything. The specification of the worth,
or the characteristic function, completes the presentation of our model. The next
step is to find stable coalition structures and to do this we follows the three steps
pioneered by Hart and Kurz (1983): 1. Find the coalition structure values, 2.
Derive the normal form of the game, 3. Identify the stable coalition structures.
4.3 Methods and Results
4.3.1 Methods
Hart and Kurz (1983) explain the coalition values as follows:
Our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts: value
and stability. The basic idea is, first, to evaluate the players’ prospects
in the various coalition structures, and then, based on these “values”,
to find which ones are stable. We call this value “coalition structure
value“, or “ CS-value” for short. (p.1047, Hart and Kurz, 1983)
A coalition structure B is a finite partition B = {B1, B2, ..., Bm} of the set of all
players N ;i.e.
⋃m
k=1Bk = N and Bk
⋂
Bl = φ for all k, l ∈M = {1, ....m}, k 6= l.
For each coalition structure B, a coalition value for each player i ∈ N is defined as
follows (Owen, 1977):
φi(v,B) =
∑
H⊂M
j/∈H
∑
S⊂Bj
i/∈S
h!(m− h− 1)!s!(bj − s− 1)!
m!bj!
[v(Q ∪ S ∪ i)− v(Q ∪ S)]
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for Bj ∈ B and i ∈ Bj where h, s and bj are the cardinalities of H, S and B, and
Q =
⋃
k∈H Bk, M = {1, ....m} such that B = {B1, B2, ..., Bm}.
The “value” corresponds to the evaluation, or expected payoff, to the players
given the coalitional structure. The value summarizes the complex possibilities
facing each player in a game in characteristic function form (Roth, 1988, p.4).
With the value attached to the coalition structure, each player is able to compare
his “prospects” in the various coalition structures and to decide whether or not to
change his coalition. A stable coalition structure is defined as a coalition structure
where no defection by any group of players or individual player is desirable.
Another alternative value is the Aumann-Dreze value (Aumann and Dreze,
1974) which is based on the interpretation that the considered coalition would actu-
ally form. Consequently in the Aumann-Dreze case side payments among coalitions
are not allowed and the interactions between coalitions are neglected, whereas side
payments among coalitions are possible in the case of the coalition structure value
and the bargaining between the coalitions is an important determinant of the val-
ues. Since we wish to study the interaction among various coalitions as well as
the interaction within a coalition, we adopt the coalitional structure value for our
analysis.
In the second step where we specify the normal form of game we have two
alternative models, γ− model and δ−model:
Model γ (Hart and Kurz, 1983): The game Γ ≡ Γv,N consists of:
(M1) the set of player is N
(M2) For each i ∈ N , the set of Σiof strategies of i consists of all coalitions S
that contain i, namely, Σi = {S ⊂ N |i ∈ S}
(M3) For each n-tuple of strategies σ = (S1, S2, ..., Sn) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 × ... × Σn
where n = |N |and each i ∈ N , the payoff to i is φi(v,B(γ)σ ), where
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T iσ =
 S
i, if Sj = Si for all j∈ Si
{i}, otherwise
and B(γ)σ = {T iσ|i ∈ N}
Model δ: The game ∆ ≡ ∆v,N is given by (M1), (M2), and (M4) :
(M4) For each n-tuple of strategies σ = (S1, S2, ..., Sn) ∈ Σ1×Σ2× ...×Σn and
each i ∈ N , the payoff to i is φi(v,Bσ), where
B(δ)σ = {T ⊂ N |i, j ∈ T if and only if Si = Sj}
The above definitions of the normal form game specify which coalition will arise
as the result of the strategies of individuals. For example, consider a coalition
structure [12|34567], which indicates that the coalition, {1, 2}, and the coalition
{3, 4, 5, 6} form. If 3 leaves his coalition, his previous coalition can either fall apart
or stick together. So the resulting coalition following 3’s departure would be either
[12|3|4|5|6|7] or [12|3|4567] depending on the interpretation of the coalition. The
first case − the “fall apart” scenario − is based on the view that a coalition results
from a unanimous agreement and model γ describes this type of coalition formation.
The second case − “stick together” − corresponds to the situation in which in a
large coalition a small number of players leaving a coalition should not influence
the other coalition members’ agreement to act together. This case is specified by
model δ.
Having specified the normal forms of the game, we need to identify the stable
coalition structure in the final step. The stable coalition structure is defined to be
a equilibrium outcome, so we need a proper equilibrium concept which addresses
the coalitional deviations. For this purpose we use the concept of the strong equi-
librium, first defined Aumann (1967) and subsequently adopted by Hart and Kurz
(1983):
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Definition 4.1 (Hart and Kurz, 1983) The coalition structure B is γ-stable (δ-
stable) in the game (v,N) if σB is a strong equilibrium in Γv,N(∆v,N , respectively);
i.e., if there exists no nonempty T ⊂ N and no σˆi ∈ Σi for all i ∈ T , such that
φi(v, Bˆ) > φi(v,B) for all i ∈ T , where Bˆ corresponds to ((σˆi)i∈T , (σjB)j∈N\T )by
(M3) (or (M4), respectively) (Hart and Kurz, 1983)
4.3.2 Results
First we note that when the wage norm ω is the only factor in economic interests
among classes and the ruling class has dominant political resources, we expect that
the society would be characterized by a horizontal conflict and the corresponding
coalition structure, [CL|WP ], would arise. In fact this is verified using the model
as follows: (see the appendix for the proof.)
• If κ = 1, αC = αL > αP = αW , αC + αL > α¯, [CL|WP ] is γ− and δ−stable
• If κ = −1, αC = αW > αL = αP , αC +αW > α¯, [CW |LP ] is γ−and δ−stable
Next we examine the effect of an imbalance in political resources in favor of
one class, namely the working class, on the stability of the coalition structures. To
do this we set αC = αL = αP and conduct the comparative statistics comparing
αC < αW < α¯ and αW < αC < α¯. We exclude the trivial case of αW > α¯ where
the working class can form a majority coalition by standing alone and hence the
coalition formation is unnecessary.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose α∗ = (1 − α¯)/2 and αC = αL = αP . We have the
following stable coalition structure.
• If 0 ≤ κ < 1, αC < α∗ < αW < α¯, [CLP |W ] is a unique γ−and δ − stable
coalition.
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• If −1 < κ < 0, αC < α∗ < αW < α¯, [CLP |W ] is a γ − stable, but not
δ − stable coalition.
• If 0 ≤ κ < 1, αW < α∗ < αC < α¯, [CWP |L] is a unique γ−and δ − stable
coalition.
• If −1 < κ < 0, αW < α∗ < αC < α¯, [CWP |L] is a γ − stable, but not
δ − stable coalition.
Proportion 4.2 asserts that when economic interests and conflict over the relative
price and the wage norm contradict each other, (−1 < κ < 1), and when the
working class has the greatest political resources among the four classes, (αC <
α∗ < αW ), a coalition among C, L, P is likely to form against W . From (4.1) we see
v(WP ) = 1 +κ, v(WC) = 1−κ, v(WL) = 0 since workers share common interests
with peasants and capitalists, and have conflict with landlords. On the contrary
when αW < α
∗ < αC , the exclusion of L may arise. Even though the capitalists
and the peasants can form a majority coalition because of αC = αP = αW , we
note that the capitalists and the peasants have no common interest, but conflict
over wage norm and relative price. So in this case only L can form a profitable
coalition of size two; v(LC) = 1+κ, v(LP ) = 1−κ, v(LW ) = 0. We see that L and
C plays the same role as W and P in the case αC < α
∗ < αW respectively, so we
expect [CWP |L] is a stable coalition. If we recall that δ−model is more relevant
to coalition formation in large groups, we may conclude that the model suggests
strongly [CLP |W ] is stable when αC < α∗ < αW < α¯ while [CWP |L] is stable for
αW < α
∗ < αC < α¯. In the next section we argue that the historical experiences
in the nineteenth-century Germany and England square with the results of the
model.
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4.4 Historical Relevance
We review the existing literature on coalition formation in nineteenth century
Germany and England and argue that the model identifies the historically plausible
coalition structure as a stable coalition structure. In addition we attempt to use
coalition formation to explain political transitions in these periods. We imagine
that four classes engage in the formation of coalitions due to a certain exogenous
change. The model suggests that if the political power of the working class is
strong, the coalition {CLP} would form, and conversely when the working class is
weak, the coalition {CWP} would arise.
From the payoff structure given in Table 2, we verify that the coalition of
capitalists, landlords, and peasants will choose the outcome (τH , ωL) since (τH , ωL)
maximizes the sum of payoffs of the classes in the coalition. If we interpret the
relative price τ as the tariff level on the agricultural output, the coalition {CLP}
can be called the coalition of protective trade policy. The interpretation of the
level of the relative price τ as the trade policy has a caveat. If some country adopts
a high tariff on the industrial sector and a high tariff on the agricultural sector,
this country’s trade policy is protective with τ still being unchanged. However the
protection of agricultural products was the main concern of protectionist policy in
late nineteenth century European countries, and thus we may use the high τ as a
representation of protectionist policy.
Since the coalition chooses the most preferred outcome of landlord class, (τH , ωL),
the coalition represents the interests of the agricultural sector. Similarly the coali-
tion in the second case {CWP} adopts the outcome (τL, ωH), so {CWP} is the
coalition of free trade policy representing the economic interests of the manufactur-
ing sector. Table 6 summarizes the results of the model in the historical contexts.
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Strong Working Class {CLP} Coalition
Protective Trade Policy
Agricultural Based Coalition
Weak Working Class {CWP} Coalition
Free Trade Policy
Manufacture Based Coalition
Table 6. The summary of results of the model
4.4.1 Evidence on Coalition Formation
In the late 19th century cheap wheat from America was exported to most Eu-
ropean countries. For example the price of wheat fell from $1.70 to $0.66 a bushel
in England between 1873 and 1894 (Kindleberger, 1951). Reactions to this agri-
cultural crisis varied from country to country. Some countries such as England
took no action; other countries such as Germany adopted a protective trade pol-
icy. The German working class at that time is characterized as well-organized and
powerful compared to those in other countries and the socialist party in England
was weak and less developed (Nolan, 1986; Gerschenkron, 1943; Gourevitch, 1977).
Accordingly we may construe the case, αC < α
∗ < αW , in proposition 4.2 above
as representative of the German situation and the case, αW < α
∗ < αC , as rep-
resentative of the English one. Moore explains how {CLP} coalition arose in the
following passage:
The Junkers managed to draw the independent peasants under their
wing and to form an alliance with sections of big industry that were
happy to receive their assistance in order to keep the industrial work-
ers in their place with a combination of repression and paternalism.
(Moore, 1965, p.115)
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The formation of a coalition {CLP} means the exclusion of the working class
from the major coalition; in Bread and Democracy, Gerschenkron provides the
possible cause of this exclusion:
An outstanding feature of that period was the rapid growth of the
Social Democratic Party. In 1890 the antisocialist law was allowed to
expire. The most impressive socialist victory was only a matter of
years. At that time the prediction made by August Bebel, the leader
of the Social Democratic Party, to the effect that socialist majority
in the German Reichstag would be attained within the lifetime of his
generation was widely believed. Such a contingency was regarded by
most German farmers as a very real menace to their economic existence.
It threatened socialization of the soil and transformation of the free
peasants, working on the land of their fathers, into hired laborers of the
socialist state. (Gerschenkron, 1943, p.28)
Because of the strong power of the working class, the peasants regarded the
strengthening of working class as a menace and were willing to join the coalition of
landlords. Similar responses from the capitalist class in the Germany can be found
in the following passage.
...out of fear of the working class the greater part of the German
bourgeoisie became reconciled to their “junior partner” status of the tra-
ditional ruling class....The bourgeois intelligentsia, heretofore the chief
carrier of the political aspirations of the bourgeoisie, split deeply. (Rit-
tberger, 1973, p.291)
Evidently the trade policy adopted in German was protective:
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It was thus under Bismarck’s aegis that the so-called protectionist
“solidarity bloc” between industry and agriculture was created, cel-
ebrating its first success in the promulgation of the tariff of 1879, by
which a number of industrial products and grain production were placed
under protection. (Gerschenkron, 1943, p.44)
In addition the short-lived Caprivi’s free trade policy (1890-1894) can be ex-
plained by the path of the coalition formation process (described in the appendix).
From the coalition structure [CWP |L] capitalist, peasants, and landlords have in-
centives to deviate and form a new coalition. Since {CWP} represents the coalition
of the free trade policy, the deviation route [CWP |L] → [CLP |W ] may explain
why the Caprivi’s policy did not last very long.
Regarding the class coalition in England, Moore (1965) provides the following
accounts of the coalition structure:
One of the reasons why such a scene seems incongruous in England
of the nineteenth century is that, unlike the Junkers, the gentry and
nobility of England had no great need to rely on political levels to prop
up a tottering economic position (Moore, 1965, p.35)
The above passage suggests that the landlords did not need to form a coalition
with other classes and {CWP} coalition would arise in England. Moreover {CWP}
coalition is characterized by the coalition representing industrialist’s interest:
In regard to agricultural problems, the Conservative governments of
1874-1879 took only small palliative measures; the Liberals from 1880
onward either let markets take their course or actively attacked agrarian
interests. By and large agriculture was allowed to shift for itself, that
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is, to commit decorous suicide with the help of a few rhetorical tears
(Moore, 1965, p.38)
In addition the trade policy against the nineteenth century crisis adopted by
Britain was free trade policy (Moore, Kindleberg, Gourevitch). This fact also
corroborates our contention that {CWP} coalition is one of the most plausible
class coalitions in England in the nineteenth century.
4.4.2 Relationship between the Class Coalitions and Political Transitions in the
Nineteenth Century
Having identified the stable coalition structure, we proceed to consider the po-
litical ramifications of class alliances and conflicts. Clearly it is a difficult task to
find the relationships between class coalitions and political transitions in general.
However in nineteenth century England and Germany we may find this connection:
The whole coalition of Junker, peasant, and industrial interest around
a program of imperialism and reaction had disastrous results for German
democracy. In England of the late nineteenth century, this combination
failed to put in an appearance. (Moore, 1965, p.38)
What underlies Moore’s argument is that the Junkers, the representative of
agriculture, were against democratization. The rising bourgeois and urban sector
are described as politically advanced and oriented towards democracy, whereas
the peasant or the agricultural sector is regressive and anti-democratic. A similar
response from the working class is founded in Gerschenkron (1943) .
When Bulow entered the chancellery Social Democracy was a giant
party, efficiently organized and working in close collaboration with pow-
erful trade unions. In a few years it was to become the strongest party
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in the German Reichstag, efficiently organized and working in close col-
laboration with powerful trade unions. It was rapidly outstripping its
revolutionary past and was transforming itself into a purely democratic,
in fact the most democratic, party in the country – a party which had
for its principal goal the democratization of Germany. (Gerschenkron,
1943, p.65)
So we may infer that Germany had late democratization, since there was a
class alliance among bourgeois, Junkers, and peasants under the dominance of
the Junkers. On the other hand in England the landed class was excluded from
the major coalition, and early democratization was possible. Therefore the model
suggests that strong working class power led to late democratization while weak
working class power brought early democratization. Gourevitch summarizes this
in the following:
In Great Britain in the 1880s the regime was solid enough without
any new sources of support but, as on the Continent, the decision on tar-
iffs reinforced existing tendencies. With the reconfirmation of the Corn
Law Repeal, the position of agriculture and landed interests crumbled.
After 1880, the absolute number of people in farming declined sharply.
While the Junkers were successfully preserving many of their privileges,
the British aristocracy lost most of those which remained. The County
Councils Act of 1888 (which ended Justice of the Peace control of local
life), the secret ballot, reform of the House of Lords, educational reor-
ganization, and reform of the status of the church can all be lined to
the waning influence of agriculture; so can British reluctance to join the
Common Market fifty years later. (Gourevitch, 1977, p.311)
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4.5 Summary
When economic conflict over tariffs and wage norms escalates, the existence of
a strong working class may lead to late democratization while the presence of a
weak working class would provide favorable conditions for the democratization; the
exclusion of the working class may delay the democratization. In the context of class
alliances this means that there is a non-monotonic relationship between political
power and economic performance. The class with strongest political power can be
excluded from the formation of a major coalition and therefore perform worst in
the bargaining process.
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APPENDIX A
CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTIONS:
LEMMA AND TABLES
First we prove the lemma used in the text.
Lemma A.1 Suppose that i ∼ exp(−γie−κs) where γi > 0, κ > 0 and −∞ < s <
∞ for i = 1, 2. Then 1 − 2 ∼ γ1γ1+γ2e−κs .
Proof. It is easy to check Λ(s) := γ1
γ1+γ2e−κs
is a distribution function. From
the definition of i, we have Pr{2 ∈ ds} = exp(−γ2e−κs)γ2 exp(−κs)κds. Hence
from the definition of conditional probability and the independence between 1 and
2, we have
Pr{1 < 2 + x} =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr{1 < s+ x}Pr{2 ∈ ds}
=
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−γ1e−κs−κx) exp(−γ2e−κs)γ2 exp(−κs)κds
=
∫ ∞
0
exp(−t(γ1e−κx + γ2))γ2dt
=
γ2
γ1e−κx + γ2
(A.1)
We use the change of variable, t = exp(−κs), in the third line and the asserted
claim follows from (A.1). 
We provide tables containing descriptive statistics and alternative estimations.
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War Number of Battles
War of the Spanish Succession 108
Thirty Years’ War 64
Austro-Turkish War 34
Great Northern War 29
Dutch War 19
War of the League of Augsburg 18
Other wars 43
Table 7. 17th century European wars.
Other wars include wars with less than ten battles. These are the Turkish War with Venice and
Austria, English Civil War, Hungarian-Turkish War, Polish-Turkish War, Second English Civil
War, The Fronde, War of the Quadruple Alliance, Polish-Swedish War, Spanish-Portuguese
War, Swedish-Danish War, The First Northern War, War of Devolution, Chamber of Reunion,
English Scottish War, Franco-Spanish War, Moldavian Campaign, Monmoth’s Rebellion, Polish
Insurgency, and Turkish-Ventian War. The classification of war is based on Dupuy and Dupuy.
(1986) and Palmer and Colton (1984).
Army Number of Battles
French 162
Imperial 173
Swedish 63
Spanish 99
Turkish 50
English 50
Dutch 64
Russian 21
Others 142
Table 8. Major armies in 17th century European wars.
More than two armies allied in some battles.
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Statistics Number of Personnel
Obs 630
Mean 21035
Max 260000
Min 1000
Standard Dev 24047
Median 15000
Table 9. Descriptive statistics for number of personnel involved in
17th century European war.
Statistics Combat Power Ratio
Obs 188
Mean 1.4332
Max 7.54
Min 0.1326
Standard Dev 1.30212
Median 1
Table 10. Descriptive statistics for combat power ratio in World War
II data.
71
17C European War
Difference Ratio Integrated
κ 2.24× 10−5 0.803
(9.30× 10−6) (0.133)
η −20.478
(5.159)
ρ 1.117
(0.214)
Number of 630 630 630
Observations
Percentage of 70.63 73.97 73.73
Correctly Predicted
Log-likelihood Value −382.443 −354.87 −354.552
Table 11. Alternative data Set.
Each battle represents both winning event and losing event. The standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and clustering.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
η −2505.666 −19.123 −20.099 −49.866
(226.199) (7.736) (19.510) (93.992)
Implied κ 0.749194 2.52424 3.739 13.9193
ρ 1.0003 1.132 1.186 1.279
(0.0000299) (0.204) (0.242) (0.340)
Number of Observation 308 315 315 184
Log-likelihood Value −182.557 −185.612 −192.636 −95.279
Table 12. Alternative estimation
Model 1: Excludes observations with armies of size greater than 100,000; Model 2: Some
observations indicate that the battle took place in the garrison. We use the dummy variable
when the observation has this indication.; Model 3: Exclude dummy variables for wars; Model 4:
Includes only battles among eight major armies: French, Imperial, Swedish, Spanish, Turkish,
English, Dutch, Russian
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APPENDIX B
CLASS ALLIANCES AND CONFLICTS:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.2
We first prove the proposition 4.2, and then provide the proof of the bench-
marking case in the end.
Case 1: αC = αL = αP < α
∗ < αW < α¯
First we consider the case: αC = αL = αP < α
∗ < αW < α¯. This corresponds
to the case where the political power of the working class is strong. For example,
(αC , αL, αW , αP ) = (0.23, 0.23, 0. 31, 0.23) for α¯ = 0.5. (Recall the assumption of
αC = αL = αP and αC+αL+αP = 1.) Only the working class is powerful enough to
makes majority coalitions of size 2. All other classes need either working class or two
more other classes to form a majority coalition. Precisely the majority coalitions
are {CW},{LW}, {WP}, {CLW}, {CLP}, {LWP}, {CWP}, {CWLP} since
αi + αj < α¯ for all i, j 6= W , αi + αW > α¯ for all i 6= W . So all the coalitions of
workers are majority coalitions. Using (4.1) and table 5, we can find the worth of
the game:
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v(S) =

1 + κ S = {WP}
1− κ S = {CW}
1 S = {CLW}, {CLP}, {LWP}, {CWP}
0 otherwise
(B.1)
This game is similar to apex games except that v(LW ) = 0 and v(CLWP ) = 0
(Hart and Kurz, 1984). However the differences turn out to be important since in
game (B.1) is a unique stable equilibrium. In the context of class alliance, since
landlords and workers do not have any common interest, the coalition between L
and W generates nothing: v(LW ) = 0. This makes the game asymmetric. The
same is true for the grand coalition as can be verified from the table 13. The worth
of the grand coalition is always 0 regardless of the levels of τ and ω. Because of
this feature of the grand coalition, this game is not super-additive. The CS value
for the game (B.1) is given in table 13.
Now we set κ = 0. The CS values for [CLWP ] and [C|L|W |P ] are the same as
the Shapley value: (0, -1/6, 1/6, 0). This means that when the coalition structure
is [CLWP ], capitalists, landlords, workers and peasants expect 0, -1/6, 1/6, and 0
as their payoffs, respectively. Imagine that the players enter a room in a random
manner and they are allowed to form a coalition inside the room. C can be a
“positive” pivot player, a player who contributes a positive worth as she enter the
room or joins the existing coalition, or a “negative” pivot player, a player who
contributes a negative worth. C is a “positive” pivot player when the orders of
entering is {WCPL}, {WCLP}, {LWCP}, {WLCP}, {PLCW}, {LPCW} (for
example, since v(WC)− v(W ) = 1 for {WCPL}). So C will expect 1/4, since out
of total possibilities (4!) the number of orders where C become a “positive” pivot
player is 6.
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C L W P
CLWP 0 16(κ− 1) 16(1− κ) 0
C|LWP −12 112(3κ− 1) 112(5− 3κ) 16
C|L|WP 16(κ− 2) 16(κ− 2) 112(5− 3κ) 112(3− κ)
C|LW |P −16 16κ 16(2− κ) −16
C|LP |W −16κ 112(3κ− 1) −16κ 112 (κ+ 1)
C|L|W |P 0 16(κ− 1) 16(1− κ) 0
CL|WP 14(κ− 1) 14(κ− 1) 14(1− κ) 14(1− κ)
CW |LP 14(1− κ) 14(κ− 1) 14(1− κ) 14(κ− 1)
CL|W |P 112(κ+ 1) 112(3κ− 1) −16κ −16κ
CW |L|P 112(3− κ) 16(κ− 2) 112(5− 3κ) 16(κ− 2)
CP |LW 0 0 0 0
CP |L|W 16 −16 −16 16
CWP |L 112(κ+ 1) −12 16(2− κ) 112(κ+ 1)
CLW |P 16 112(3κ− 1) 112(5− 3κ) −12
CLP |W 112(3− κ) 16κ −12 112(3− κ)
Table 13. CS values for −1 < κ < 1
On the other hand, when the sequences of entering is [PWLC], [WPLC],
[LPWC], [PLWC], [WLPC], [LWPC], C becomes a “negative” pivot player,
who contributes -1. This is because the joining of C into the existing coalition
drops the worth of that coalition from 1 to 0. This feature highlights the nature
of class conflicts: a grand coalition would not do any good. Since C can be a
“negative” pivot player with the probability of 1/4, C expects -1/4 from being a
negative pivot. As the expected payoff from the positive pivot is 1/4 and the one
from the negative pivot is -1/4, the capitalist expects 0 payoff in total when the
coalition structure is [CLWP ]. A similar explanation is applied to the payoff of
peasants.
The payoff -1/6 of L comes from the fact that L cannot be a pivot player when
L is the second players in the random order. In a random order such as [OLOO],
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L cannot be a positive player unlike the capitalist or the peasant. This is because
L does not have a common interest with W : v(LW ) = 0. Under the condition
that L is less powerful, L can contribute a positive worth in the coalition of size
2 only with more powerful class, W . However, since L does not have a common
interest with W , this is impossible unlike C and P . This is why L expects -1/6 in
the coalition structure [CLWP ].
For the case of [CW |L|P ], CS values are given by (C,L,W, P ) = (1/4, -1/3,
5/12, -1/3 ). These numbers show well how the CS value can characterize inter-
actions among coalitions and within coalition. First, in this coalition structure
we think that {CW} forms one representative agent, A and A ,L, P engages in
bargaining. The worth for this new bargaining is v(A) = v(AL) = v(AP ) = 1,
v(L) = v(P ) = v(LP ) = v(ALP ) = 0. Again by using a similar argument we find
the Shapley value for this new game: (A,L, P ) = (2/3, -1/3, -1/3). This is the
bargaining process among the coalitions.
Secondly, the bargaining within coalition occurs. Since we have only one coali-
tion {CW}, we consider the bargaining within {CW} only. To determine the
bargaining within {CW}, we need to consider what is the “disagreement point”.
Because the player has a option to get out of the coalition, the natural “disagree-
ment point” would be the expected payoff that the player will get when she gets
out of the coalition. Therefore, C has 0 as its “fallback” payoff and W has 1/6 as
its “fallback” since [C|L|W |P ] = (0, -1/6, 1/6, 0). Using this we obtain a new game
which occurs within the coalition {CW}: v(C) = 0, v(W ) = 1/6, v(CW ) = 2/3
(since v(A) = 2/3 and (A,LP ) =(2/3, -1/3, -1/3)). Again we find the Shapley
values for this case and this turns out to be (C,W ) = (1/4, 5/12). Combining the
first result and the second result, we find CS values for [CW |L|P ] as (C,L,W, P )
= (1/4, -1/3, 5/12, -1/3 ). Other lines of CS values can be interpreted similarly.
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Now we can show the following claims.
Claim 1. When 0 ≤ κ < 1, [CLP |W ] is γ- and δ- stable.
CS values for [CLP |W ] is (3−κ
12
, κ
6
,−1
2
, 3−κ
12
). We note that 3−κ
12
, κ
6
, 3−κ
12
are the
maximum values for capitalists, landlords, and peasants over all coalition struc-
tures, respectively. Therefore from the definition of the strong equilibrium, it fol-
lows that [CLP |W ] is γ- and δ- stable; workers cannot form a deviating coalition
since all other classes achieve the maximum values at [CLP |W ].
Claim 2. When −1 < κ < 0, [CLP |W ] is γ- and δ- stable.
Since the only possible deviation for this case is from [CLP |W ] to [CW |LP ]
(3−κ
12
< 1−κ
4
for C and −1
2
< 1−κ
4
for L) and this deviation corresponds to δ-model,
we see that [CLP |W ] is γ-stable, but not δ-stable.
Claim 3. When 0 ≤ κ < 1, [CLP |W ] is a unique γ- and δ- equilibrium.
For this claim we classify the possible coalitional deviation as follows.
i. The exclusion of a working class
The coalition structure with a coalition size greater than or equal to 3 can
deviate by excluding workers.
[CLW |P ]→ [CLP |W ], [CWP |L]→ [CLP |W ], [C|LWP ]→ [CLP |W ], [CLWP ]
→ [CLP |W ]
This follows from the fact that the maximum values for C, L, P do not occurs
at these coalition structures with a coalition of size greater than 3 except [CLP |W ];
C, L and P can form a profitable deviational coalition. Because [C|L|W |P ] has the
same CS values as the grand coalition, we find the following deviation: [C|L|W |P ]
→ [CLP |W ]
This phenomenon is similar to the exclusion of the major player in the apex
game (Hart and Kurz, 1984). The exclusion of the major player, the working
class, was first established by von Neumann and Morgenstein who call this “the
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segregation of the major player” (Von Neumann and Morgenstein, 1944). When a
certain class is strong enough, the other classes have a strong incentive to form a
coalition against this class.
ii. The exclusion of capitalists, landlords, or peasants
[CW |LP ] → [C|LWP ], [CL|WP ] → [CLW |P ], [CP |LW ] → [CWP |L]
The possibility of these deviations can be verified using CS values of the table 13.
The idea behind these deviations is that the working class always has an incentive
to exclude the partner class in its coalition (e.g. C in [CW |LP ]) and form a new
coalition with the other remaining two classes. The vertical class conflict (the
conflict between CW vs LP ) and the horizontal class conflict (the conflict between
CL vs WP ) can be resolved by the “ternary” coalition led by the working class.
iii. The formation of opposing coalitions
[CW |L|P ] → [CW |LP ], [C|LW |P ] → [CP |LW ], [C|L|WP ] → [CL|WP ],
[C|LP |W ] → [CW |LP ],[C|L|WP ] → [CL|WP ], [CL|W |P ] → [CL|WP ],
[CP |L|W ]→ [CP |LW ]
These deviations are symbolically characterized as follows:[OO||]→ [OO|].
If two of classes already form a coalition, the remaining two players always have
incentives to form a opposing coalition against the existing coalition. Each class
can get more benefit from forming a counter-coalition rather than remaining as a
stand-alone class. These deviations show the routes along which the class conflict
can be exacerbated by the formation of an opposing coalition.
Since the deviation paths in the above satisfies both model γ and δ, there is no
γ- and δ- stable coalition structure except [CLP |W ]. Therefore proposition 4.2)
follows from claim 1 and claim 2. Moreover since the all γ- and δ- stable coalition
structures are α- and β- core states, [CLP |W ] is also α- and β- core states.(see
Aumann, 1967; Hart and Kurz, 1983, for the definitions of core states and the
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relation among stability concepts) The existence and uniqueness of the coalition
structure are strong results. There are some games which do not possess a stable
coalition structure. Also considering the fact that many coalitional games have
multiple stable coalition structures, the uniqueness result is critical.
Here we propose one likely path of coalition formation process:
[C|L|W |P ]→ [CW |L|P ]→ [CW |LP ]→ [CWP |L]→ [CLP |W ]
Starting from an initial coalition [C|L|W |P ], a coalition between C and W can
arise. This leads to the coalition [CW |L|P ]. Afterward the confrontation among
classes increase by the coalition of L and P . This class conflict may be resolved by
P ’s deserting L or the exclusion of L. Finally L can successfully induce C and P
into the exclusion of W .
Case 2: αC = αL = αP < α
∗ < αW < α¯
Next we consider the second case: 0 < αW < α
∗. one example of this case is
(αC , αL, αW , αP ) = (0.27, 0.27, 0.19, 0.27) for α¯ = 1/2. Since αi + αW < α¯ for all
i 6= W and αi + αj > α¯ for all i, j 6= W (because α¯> 1/2), majority coalitions are
{CL}, {CP}, {LP}, {CLW}, {CLP}, {LWP}, {CWP}, {CWLP}
Therefore the following game is obtained.
v(S) =

1 + κ S = {CL}
1− κ S = {LP}
1 S = {CLW}, {CLP}, {LWP}, {CWP}
0 otherwise
(B.2)
By the examination of equation (B.1) for case 1 and equation (B.2), we can see
that the only differences are that L and W change the roles, and C and P change
the roles. Specifically we define φ : {C,L,W, P} → {C,L,W, P} by φ(C) = P,
φ(L) = W, φ(W ) = L, φ(P ) = C. Then the game (B.2) is obtained by applying
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C L W P
CLWP 16
1
6 −16 −16
C|LWP −12 12 0 0
C|L|WP 16 16 −16 −16
C|LW |P −16 13 0 −16
C|LP |W −16 13 −16 0
C|L|W |P 16 16 −16 −16
CL|WP 12 12 −12 −12
CW |LP 0 0 0 0
CL|W |P 12 12 −12 −12
CW |L|P 13 −16 0 −16
CP |LW 0 0 0 0
CP |L|W 13 −16 −16 0
CWP |L 12 −12 0 0
CLW |P 13 13 −16 −12
CLP |W 13 13 −12 −16
Table 14. CS values for κ = 1
φ to (B.1) Therefore the results follow. Finally, we check the benchmarking case.
When κ = 1, αC = αL > αW = αP , αC + αL > α¯,we have
v(S) =

2 if S = {CL}
1 if S = {CLW}, {CLP}, {LWP}, {CWP}
0 otherwise
In this case the CS values are given by
so we see that [CL|WP ] is γ − stable and δ − stable. The second case follows
from the symmetry among C, L, W , and P .
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